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Article

The Green Option
†

Gideon Parchomovsky & Endre Stavang
INTRODUCTION

In this Article we advance a new policy tool designed to reinvigorate investment in green technologies. We propose that
green companies be given an option to transfer a block of their
shares to any corporation of their choice. Making established
corporations shareholders in green companies will incentivize
them to switch to environmentally friendly technologies and
use their political clout to alleviate legal, regulatory, and political barriers to the adoption of such technologies. In short, giving established corporations a stake in green companies will
give them a stake in the environment. Concretely, we propose
enacting legislation that will empower green companies that
meet certain conditions to transfer a call option to buy a block
of its shares to an established company of their choice. The option will be given for free; the established company that receives the option will not have to pay anything for it initially.
The exercise price will be the price of the green company’s
share at the time of the transfer and the receiving company will
have a period of five years to exercise. We call this novel mech† Gideon Parchomovsky is the Robert G. Fuller Jr. Professor of Law,
University of Pennsylvania Law School; Professor, Bar Ilan University Faculty
of Law, Israel. Endre Stavang is a Professor, Faculty of Law, Oslo University,
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anism the “green option.” What distinguishes the green option
from standard call options is that unlike regular call options
that simply expire on their maturity date, in our case, the established company will be legally mandated to exercise the option at the end of the five-year period, even at a loss. Allowing
the option to expire is not an option for the established firm.
A concrete example can help illustrate our proposal. Green
NRG Co. is a startup company that develops a new technology
for producing clean energy. Brown Inc. is a large corporation
that operates power plants in several coastal states. Under our
proposal, Green NRG would be able to transfer a free call option to buy 1,000,000 of its shares to Brown Inc. Assume that
the call option was transferred in 2012 when a share of Green
NRG was worth $1. Brown Inc. will have until 2017 to exercise
the option. Since Brown Inc. can’t just let the option expire, it
will make an effort to ensure that Green NRG’s shares appreciate in value. For example, if the value of Green NRG’s shares
goes up to $3 per share, Brown Inc. will have a $2 million profit. If, on the other hand, Green NRG’s technology fails and the
share price falls to $0.10 per share, Brown Inc. will lose
$900,000.
The proposed mechanism will give established firms an incentive to help the green technology in which they are invested
to succeed in the marketplace. And if technological change and
innovation are to truly help us bridge the gap between growing
wants and resource-based constraints in the world, such new
ideas as ours must be put on the table. Currently, the world is
facing an idea crunch on the right kind of policy levers to enhance green technology investment. The incorrect setting of
subsidies has forced European countries to withdraw or drasti1
cally reduce these incentives. Extant market instruments such
as tradable green certificates or renewable portfolio standards
focus largely on energy efficiency and have had only marginal
impact on technology changes. These market instruments have
failed to drive up innovation—especially in the case of new en2
ergy-efficient technologies that are in their nascent stage, and

1. FRANKFURT SCH.-UNEP COLLABORATING CTR. FOR CLIMATE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY FIN., GLOBAL TRENDS IN RENEWABLE ENERGY INVESTMENT
2013, at 38 (2013), available at http://www.unep.org/pdf/GTR-UNEP-FS
-BNEF2.pdf.
2. Anna Bergek & Staffan Jacobsson, Are Tradable Green Certificates a
Cost-Efficient Policy Driving Technical Change or a Rent-Generating Machine?
Lessons from Sweden 2003–2008, 38 ENERGY POL’Y 1255, 1266–67 (2010).

PARCHOMOVSKY_4fmt

2015]

1/6/2015 2:22 PM

THE GREEN OPTION

969
3

green technologies that are better but involve higher cost —or
4
to enhance dynamic efficiency. When presented with an option,
private actors tend to prefer cheaper and more conventional
green technologies, resulting in lesser innovation in third gen5
eration green technologies. In contrast, we think our proposal
is a way to increase corporate social responsibility without unnecessary tinkering with ordinary market processes. It increases the range of instruments to be analyzed by environmental
law and economics scholars, and to be discussed in policy cir6
cles and ultimately in the legislature.
From a legal standpoint, the mechanism we propose is not
unprecedented. The use of forced transfers is not foreign to the
law. For example, in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, the
Supreme Court upheld as constitutional legislation that empowered tenants to force an ownership transfer upon their
7
landlord. The legislation was adopted to ameliorate land concentration problems. Furthermore, in the nineteenth century,
railroad companies were given the power to take private prop8
erty in exchange for the payment of compensation. The goal of
the forced transactions in this case was to facilitate train
transportation—the cutting edge technology of the time. Com-

3. Aviel Verbruggen & Volkmar Lauber, Assessing the Performance of
Renewable Electricity Support Instruments, 45 ENERGY POL’Y 635, 640 (2012).
4. Id. at 641.
5. Nick Johnstone et al., Renewable Energy Policies and Technological
Innovation: Evidence Based on Patent Counts, 45 ENVTL. RESOURCE ECON.
133, 134, 147–48, 151 (2010).
6. For a fairly recent and reasonably comprehensive account, see ALFRED
ENDRES, ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS: THEORY AND POLICY 130–40, 187–201
(2011) (focusing on dynamic incentives and technological change as drivers of
better environmental policies). This exposition, moreover, shows how much
the distinct perspectives of (environmental) law and economics have converged
in the best practices of mainstream environmental economics, thus further
lowering the potential for controversy around this particular branch of interdisciplinary legal scholarship.
7. 467 U.S. 229, 239–43 (1984).
8. See Abraham Bell, Private Takings, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 517, 517 (2009)
(“[P]rivate takings—that is, takings carried out by nongovernmental actors—
have a solid basis in our legal system.”); Barbara J. Evans, Much Ado About
Data Ownership, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 69, 84–85 (2011) (“There is a long history in the United States, dating back to colonial times, of delegating takings
power to private parties—such as developers of milldams and railroads—so
that they can take property directly for socially beneficial uses without having
the government act as an intermediary.”). Even today, state and local governments routinely delegate their takings power to private development corporations for land assembly purposes. Bell, supra, at 549–50.
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pared to these and other historical precedents, our proposed
scheme is far less intrusive and controversial.
That said, we are cognizant of the fact that our proposal
constitutes an economic imposition on established companies.
One might argue that forcing established companies to accept a
call option on the shares of green companies is tantamount to
imposing a tax on them, or, more accurately, forcing them to
subsidize green production. There is a kernel of truth to this
argument, but it is largely overstated. It is critical to understand that unlike direct taxation, our proposal also creates a
meaningful potential upside for established companies. The rub
lies elsewhere: the real concern our proposal raises relates to
the level of risk to which we expose established companies.
Many producers of green technologies are startup companies
that face a very uncertain business future. After all, most
startups have a short commercial life expectancy and the likelihood of their failure far exceeds that of their success. This
concern is real. However, it can be alleviated via the adoption
of a simple constraint. The legislation we propose should be
confined to green companies that (a) have a proven working
technology that has been commercialized; and (b) have been in
business for at least five years. The introduction of these twin
conditions will significantly reduce the potential risk our proposal poses for established firms.
Furthermore, we believe that this risk is worth taking given the proposal’s potential upside. A recent study reveals a
steep fall of twenty-nine percent in the 2012 investment figures
9
for green technologies in developed countries. Developed nations and conglomerates within, who have stronger leverage to
10
resolve the problem, are balking from the solution. The recorded decline suggests that the time has come to think afresh
about the interface between law, business, and the environment.
The adoption of our proposal will have several salutary effects. First, it will facilitate market adoption of green technologies. It bears emphasis that we are by no means arguing that
green technology will never be adopted without our mechanism.
Rather, we submit that implementing our proposal will accelerate the pace at which green technologies are adopted. It is
important to understand that the introduction of any technolo9. See FRANKFURT SCH.-UNEP COLLABORATING CTR. FOR CLIMATE &
SUSTAINABLE ENERGY FIN., supra note 1, at 20.
10. Id. at 13–14.
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gy—green or not—is an uphill battle. Technological changes
are costly for businesses. Even technologies that can clearly reduce operation costs or increase profits may not be adopted on
account of short horizons and legal concerns. Specifically, the
adoption of unproven technologies may expose companies to
production glitches and enhanced liability. Technological
changes invariably involve switching costs and uncertainty,
and these two effects combine to create a certain status quo bias. When the technology at issue is only marginally better than
the prevailing technology, profit-maximizing corporations will
often decide to pass them up.
Insofar as green technologies are concerned, the barrier to
entry is even greater. Green technologies often fall under the
11
category of “disruptive technologies” —innovations that may
compromise performance in the short term but yield considera12
ble benefits in the long run. As Clayton Christensen persuasively argued, established companies have all the incentives of
marketplace incumbents: they are reluctant to adopt technologies that challenge existing production paradigms and prefer to
hold steadfastly to the dominant technology they currently
13
use. Moreover, green technologies often produce social benefits—both tangible and ideological—that cannot fully be captured by market prices. In that sense, they present the mirrorimage problem of that analyzed by R.H. Coase in his seminal
14
The Problem of Social Cost. Giving established business a
share in the upside of green companies will make them more
welcoming to green technologies, and if the upside is large
enough, it may even convert them into champions of green
technologies.
Second, and relatedly, having a stake in green technologies
will induce the holding companies and their business partners
to come up with complementary products and processes. This,
in turn, will increase the demand for green technologies and
reduce barriers to entry for other environmentally minded
11. See CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA: WHEN
NEW TECHNOLOGIES CAUSE GREAT COMPANIES TO FAIL, at xv (1997).
12. Id. Electric cars provide a perfect example. At present, the performance of electric cars is inferior to that of cars operated by gas and it is more
cumbersome to own an electric car. However, in the long term, the performance of electric cars is likely to equal, if not surpass, that of gas cars, and the
costs associated with electric cars both to the owner and to society at large will
be much lower.
13. Id. at 9–24, 29–56.
14. R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
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businesses. Over time, this dynamic may result in a virtuous
cycle that will transform the attitude of the business community toward environmentally friendly goods. From a broader social perspective, the gains will be even greater on account of the
positive spillovers of green technologies.
Third, our proposal can go a long way toward leveling the
political playing field. To get a handle on this effect, it is imperative to understand that legal and regulatory environments
can dramatically affect the fate of new technologies. There is a
rich theoretical and empirical economic literature showing that
laws and regulations are adopted at the behest of influential
business interests to create a barrier to entry for new entrants.
The environmental domain is no exception. Established businesses with political clout can effectively bar entry of green innovation. One only needs to think about the obstacles to the introduction of electric cars to see the role of the political system
in channeling innovation. The political environment would be
very different, however, if incumbent firms had an interest in
the success of green companies. The partial alignment of interest our proposal is intended to bring about will amplify the
voice of green interests in the political world and will give them
meaningful representation in the political process. This, in
turn, may result in more environmentally-oriented policies and
laws.
Fourth, and finally, our proposal is superior to various subsidization schemes as it relies almost exclusively on the market. Subsidization of green technologies is not only potentially
wasteful of taxpayer money, but may also lead to serious market distortions. Subsidization introduces the risk of favoritism.
Politicians may elect to funnel money to their potential supporters rather than to the most meritorious green firms. Furthermore, subsidization decisions are made early on in the
technology-development process and under conditions of extreme uncertainty. As a result, even bracketing out concerns
about favoritism, subsidization may result in the funding of the
wrong companies. The relatively low success rate of venture
capital funds and other private institutions in picking startups
should serve as a warning sign to anyone who thinks that the
government will do a better job. Our mechanism, by contrast,
stimulates market competition and revelation of information.
We leave it to the green companies themselves to decide whether and to whom to put their options. Our proposal fosters true
market experimentation by lowering barriers to entry. It does

PARCHOMOVSKY_4fmt

2015]

1/6/2015 2:22 PM

THE GREEN OPTION

973

not risk public money. Consequently, it does not impose a cost
on the public.
Structurally, this Article unfolds in three parts. In Part I,
we discuss the legal and business obstacles faced by green
technologies. We demonstrate that under the current legal regime, green technologies are unfairly disadvantaged relative to
conventional technologies. We argue that this state of affairs is
unwarranted and thus requires policymakers to level the playing field. In Part II, we introduce the green option mechanism,
explain how it should be operationalized and assess its
strengths and weaknesses. We then proceed to compare it to alternative state-sponsored mechanisms, such as subsidization,
that are commonly used to support socially desirable activities
and show that our mechanism is vastly superior. Finally, in
Part III, we address potential objections to our proposal. A
short Conclusion ensues.
I. IT AIN’T EASY BEING GREEN
Although some people erroneously assume a perfectly competitive marketplace is one in which new technologies instantaneously replace older ones, in reality, the road to commercial
success is long and treacherous. As a matter of fact, “[m]ost
technological innovations do not survive the transition from in15
vention to marketplace success.” Innovative technologies,
among them green ones, must traverse a host of regulatory and
financial obstacles before they are adopted. In this Part, we will
enumerate and discuss the legal and economic challenges faced
by green technologies. We will demonstrate that green technologies are currently required to compete on a slanted playing
field; the odds are stacked overwhelmingly against them. In
light of this fact, and given the social desirability of green innovation, in Part II we will propose a way to facilitate the introduction of environmentally friendly technologies. But, first, we
would like to elucidate the many obstacles green technologies
encounter on their way to markets.
A. LEGAL BARRIERS
Technological competition is a desirable phenomenon, one
we most certainly welcome. Technological competition is the
15. Marilyn A. Brown & Sharon (Jess) Chandler, Governing Confusion:
How Statutes, Fiscal Policy, and Regulations Impede Clean Energy Technologies, 19 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 472, 473 (2008).
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mechanism by which older technologies are replaced by newer,
more effective ones. It is important to realize, however, that the
process is far from perfect. Tempting though it might be to believe that superior new technologies will always drive inferior
technologies out of the market, in reality the opposite might
happen. To understand why, it is critical to explore the effect of
legal rules and regulations on technological competition. Competition among technologies does not occur in a vacuum. Rather, it takes place in an institutional environment shaped by
the law. Law, in turn, may be innovation welcoming or innova16
tion impeding. For example, regulations that adopt progressively lower emission rates of greenhouse gases will have the
17
effect of spurring cleaner manufacturing processes. Contrariwise, regulations that mandate treatment of toxic waste in a
particular uniform way are liable to exert a chilling effect on
18
the invention of new treatment technologies. Unfortunately,
in the case of the environment, the law often creates barriers to
the development and adoption of green technologies. This effect
may be intended or unintended, but either way it hinders green
innovation.
1. Grandfathering and Regulatory Lacunas
Over the past several decades, Congress has adopted vari19
ous measures to protect the environment. Foremost among

16. In theory, it is possible to imagine a legal regime that adopts a completely neutral stance to innovation. In reality, this result is virtually impossible. As the discussion in the text illustrates, there are so many laws and regulations that affect the rate of technological substitution—both directly and
indirectly—that it is hard to conceive of a state of affairs in which the opposing
effects precisely cancel each other out.
17. See Michael E. Porter & Claas van der Linde, Toward a New Conception of the Environment-Competitiveness Relationship, 9 J. ECON. PERSP. 97,
100–04 (1995). For an economic analysis of how conventional government regulations can stimulate environmentally friendly innovations, see Joel F.
Bruneau, A Note on Permits, Standards, and Technological Innovation, 48 J.
ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 1192, 1198 (2004); Juan-Pablo Montero, Permits,
Standards, and Technology Innovation, 44 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 23, 31–
39 (2002).
18. See, e.g., Martha L. Noble & J.W. Looney, The Emerging Legal
Framework for Animal Agricultural Waste Management in Arkansas, 47 ARK.
L. REV. 159 (1994) (discussing the legal regulations of animal and agricultural
waste in Arkansas and how those regulations tailor the local efforts to deal
with polluting waste, including an examination of common law remedies and
corporate responsibility).
19. For general discussion, see RICHARD J. LAZARUS, THE MAKING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 67–165 (2004).
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those are the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water Act, and the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
22
Liability Act. These laws set various standards intended to
safeguard important ecological amenities and promote environmental goals. At the same time, in response to the demand
of powerful lobby groups, Congress introduced several exceptions and riders that undermined the pro-environmental
23
goals. The most famous and oft-cited example is the grandfathering of coal plants under the Clean Air Act, which exempted
most old coal-producing plants from the new performance
24
standards. This exemption has proven especially detrimental
25
to public health and clean energy technologies. The high cost
of compliance with standards set by the Act for new plants
prompted plant owners to do whatever they could to prolong
26
the operation of the old coal facilities. The dual regulatory regime created by the Act had another undesirable effect: it
disincentivized old plant operators from improving their facilities for fear that doing so would change the classification of
their plants from old to new and subject them to the heightened
27
standards that apply to the latter category.

20. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–671q (2012). The vast majority of the laws were enacted in the 1970s. For a comprehensive review, see Richard J. Lazarus, Congressional Descent: The Demise of Deliberative Democracy in Environmental
Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 619, 623–29 (2006).
21. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–387 (2012).
22. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–675.
23. CURTIS MOORE & ALAN MILLER, GREEN GOLD: JAPAN, GERMANY, THE
UNITED STATES, AND THE RACE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGY 82–84
(1994); Matthew J. Rizzo, The Endangered Species Act and Federal Agency Inaction, 13 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 855, 874 (1994).
24. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–671q; Jonathan Remy Nash & Richard L.
Revesz, Grandfathering and Environmental Regulation: The Law and Economics of New Source Review, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1677, 1681–82 (2007) (discussing this example and suggesting that it was initially meant to be temporary).
25. According to a 2011 study by the American Lung Association, coalfired plants are the most harmful source of industrial pollution in the United
States. See AM. LUNG ASS’N, TOXIC AIR: THE CASE FOR CLEANING UP COALFIRED POWER PLANTS 1–5 (2011), available at http://www.lung.org/assets/
documents/healthy-air/toxic-air-report.pdf.
26. This has come to be known as the “old plant effect.” See BRUCE A.
ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR 67–68 (1981) (introducing and explaining this effect).
27. See Shi-Ling Hsu, The Real Problem with New Source Review, 36
ENVTL. L. REP. 10,095, 10,096–98 (2006).
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Another disconcerting example is provided by the Toxic
28
Substances Control Act (TSCA). Enacted by Congress in 1976,
this legislation was supposed to regulate the handling and dis29
posal of potentially dangerous chemicals. Unlike other environmental laws that have been amended over the years, the
TSCA remained frozen in time for about three and half decades. As a result, the standards that apply to toxic substances
in the United States are out of step with those existing in many
30
European countries. To make things worse, the legislation
grandfathered in—without safety testing—over 60,000 industrial chemicals which were in use in 1976, and allowed chemi31
cals that were developed subsequently to enter the market.
According to one report, “in the 34 years since the TSCA was
enacted, the EPA [Environmental Protection Agency] has required testing for only 200 chemicals out of the more than
80,000 available for use in the United States, and has regulat32
ed only five.”
Grandfathering is also ubiquitous in land use regulations.
Zoning amendments usually exempt existing non-conforming
33
uses. As a result, land uses that hurt the environment can
persist unimpeded for a long time. The regulation of residential
and commercial structures also features extensive grandfathering. Local governments typically apply green building principles to new structures. Old ones are typically exempt from
34
complying with heightened energy standards. Although retrofitting of old buildings imposes a significant cost on the owner,
in the long run the energy savings could more than offset it. Also, if owners of existing buildings were required to comply, it
28. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601–697 (2012).
29. Cynthia Ruggerio, Referral of Toxic Chemical Regulation Under the
Toxic Substances Control Act: EPA’s Administrative Dumping Ground, 17 B.C.
ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 75, 75, 85–89 (1989).
30. Dorit Kerret & Alon Tal, Greenwash or Green Gain? Predicting the
Success and Evaluating the Effectiveness of Environmental Voluntary Agreements, 14 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 31, 38 (2005).
31. Bryan Walsh, Regulation of Toxic Chemicals Faces Tightening, TIME
MAG. (Apr. 16, 2010), http://content.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,
1982489,00.html.
32. Id.
33. Christopher Serkin, Existing Uses and the Limits of Land Use Regulations, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1222, 1224 (2009) (noting the existence of “a strong
background rule running throughout the law of property that existing uses are
entitled to protection from the government”).
34. Bruce R. Huber, Transition Policy in Environmental Law, 35 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 91, 99 (2011).
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would create an incentive to come up with innovative and more
cost-effective techniques to accomplish this result. Yet, local
lawmakers prefer to protect homeowners from transitions. Indeed, building codes presented a serious obstacle to green construction, at least in the beginning: “The use of alternative
methods, materials, and designs fell outside of the prescriptions
35
in most building codes.” As one commentator correctly observed, grandfathering and “[e]xcessive transition relief may
also create new barriers to entry in a sector by favoring incum36
bents; these barriers, once erected, are difficult to remove.”
It is important to understand at this point that laws containing grandfathering provisions are not the worst possible
outcome for the environment. Regulatory lacunas could lead to
much worse results. Consider the case of coal ash damping.
Although scientists are of the opinion that the best way to dispose of coal ash is to bury it in dry landfills equipped with special facilities, the favored disposal method used by the industry
37
is to store ash coal in wet ponds. This method reached public
awareness in 2009 when it resulted in a spill that effused “a
billion gallons of toxic sludge across 300 acres of East Tennes38
see.” According to one report, there exist over 1,300 ponds like
39
the one in East Tennessee nationwide. In the last thirty years,
the EPA has been trying to come up with a regulatory framework to address the handling of ash coal, but so far all its ef40
forts have fallen short. In the absence of federal regulation,
the matter was left for the states. However, there is consensus
35. Keith H. Hirokawa, At Home with Nature: Early Reflections on Green
Building Laws and the Transformation of the Built Environment, 39 ENVTL. L.
507, 521 (2009); see also Alexandra Dapolito Dunn, Siting Green Infrastructure: Legal and Policy Solutions To Alleviate Urban Poverty and Promote
Healthy Communities, 37 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 41, 63 (2010) (pointing out
how downspout disconnection programs, effective in promoting the use of captured water for irrigation and green roofs, stood deterred by city regulations
that required downspouts to be connected with storm sewer systems, and rain
capture was rendered impermissible in certain states because of prior appropriation laws).
36. Huber, supra note 34, at 93–94; see also Serkin, supra note 33, at
1261–80, 1281 (stating and explaining how the intuition that existing uses
demand categorical protection lacks sufficient social justification).
37. Coal Ash: Hazardous to Human Health, PHYSICIANS FOR SOC. RESP.
(Aug. 5, 2013, 3:47 PM), http://www.psr.org/assets/pdfs/coal-ash-hazardous-to
-human-health.pdf.
38. Shaila Dewan, Hundreds of Coal Ash Dumps Lack Regulation, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 6, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/07/us/07sludge.html.
39. Id.
40. Id.

PARCHOMOVSKY_4fmt

978

1/6/2015 2:22 PM

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[99:967

among experts that states are ill-equipped to deal with the is41
sue. And so, in the absence of effective regulatory oversight,
power plants naturally elect to handle the matter in the least
costly way for them, even if it comes at a great cost to the environment. Effectively, the current practice of damping ash coal
is a typical example of an unaccounted for externality that creates a social cost. This much has been pointed out by law and
42
economics scholars a long time ago. A less obvious cost is the
chilling effect of this practice on environmentally friendly innovation. As long as the power industry can externalize harms
onto the rest of our society at no cost to itself, it has no incentive to adopt greener disposal technologies. This, in turn,
means that such technologies may never be developed.
Rigid environmental norms can also result in delayed
adoption, or absolute curtailing, of transition to green technologies. For instance, in the baking industry, the EPA requires
ethanol emission reductions between the range of eighty to
ninety-five percent for any technology to qualify as a reasonably available control technology (RACT). The EPA has determined catalytic oxidation to be the only RACT that achieves
this rigid reduction limit. The fallout of this is that more innovative and cheaper solutions that do not make use of toxic metals fail to receive EPA approval, despite their reduction efficacy
being only slightly lower than the prescribed range. This also
results in “close enough” cleaner technologies failing to obtain
the commercial testing, demonstration, and refinement needed
43
to improve their performance. Similarly, the SO2 emission rate
limits prior to 1990 created a technology lock-in because many
electrical utilities were compelled to use scrubbers, an “energy44
intensive technology producing high levels of waste.” When
these rigid limits were replaced with an overall performance
41. Id.
42. See Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Cities, Property and
Positive Externalities, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 211, 220–28 (2012) (noting that
“negative externalities were the key impetus for the development of the law
and economics movement”). The classic articles on the subject can be found in
ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 111–359 (1920) (suggesting
that the problem of social cost be addressed by the imposition of tax on the
private actors responsible for it) and Coase, supra note 14, at 8–15 (arguing
that when transaction costs are sufficiently low private contracting can adequately address the social cost problem).
43. ENVTL. LAW INST., BARRIERS TO ENVIRONMENTAL TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION AND USE 43 (1998), available at http://www.eli.org/sites/default/
files/eli-pubs/d8.01.pdf.
44. Id. at 4.
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standard, cleaner process technologies could easily replace
scrubbers and deliver the same result at almost half the earlier
45
cost. Cryptic barriers of this kind are “sticky” because a firm
that invests in changing a standard would be opening the market for its competitors too. This acts as a disincentive, stopping
46
them from working towards eliminating the barrier.
Another environmentally harmful activity that has evaded
federal regulation so far is “fracking.” Fracking consists of the
practice of forcefully injecting fluids into rock cracks in order to
release gas out of the rock formation and allow it to be extract47
ed. By many accounts, the practice of fracking presents a real
risk to our drinking water. In the past, the wastewater that
contained a high degree of salt and other harmful minerals was
48
dumped, untreated, into rivers. The current industry practice
49
is to store the water in artificial ponds. However, due to leakage, some of the wastewater reached underground wells. The
use of fracking has jeopardized the water supply of areas in
50
Pennsylvania and New Mexico. To make matters worse, some
contend that the practice induces earthquakes and that the
earthquakes in Ohio several years ago were caused by
51
fracking. Yet, there is no federal regulation pertaining to the
practice, and the states let the practice continue virtually unregulated for decades. Only recently, in response to public outcry, states’ environmental agencies turned their attention to

45. Id.
46. ALICE STOVER ET AL., AM. COUNCIL FOR AN ENERGY-EFFICIENT ECON.,
CRYPTIC BARRIERS TO ENERGY EFFICIENCY REPORT NUMBER A135, at 1, 14–15
(2013), available at http://www.aceee.org/sites/default/files/publications/
researchreports/a135.pdf.
47. See REBECCA HAMMER & JEANNE VANBRIESEN, NATURAL RES. DEF.
COUNCIL, IN FRACKING’S WAKE: NEW RULES ARE NEEDED TO PROTECT OUR
HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT FROM CONTAMINATED WASTEWATER REPORT
NUMBER D:12-05-A, at 1 (2012), available at http://www.nrdc.org/energy/files/
fracking-wastewater-fullreport.pdf.
48. Christopher Joyce, With Gas Boom, Pennsylvania Fears New Toxic
Legacy, NPR (May 14, 2012, 12:10 PM), http://www.npr.org/2012/05/14/
149631363/when-fracking-comes-to-town-it-s-water-water-everywhere.
49. ELIZABETH RIDLINGTON & JOHN RUMPLER, ENV’T AM. RESEARCH &
POLICY CTR., FRACKING BY THE NUMBERS: KEY IMPACTS OF DIRTY DRILLING AT
THE STATE AND NATIONAL LEVEL 10–11 (2013), available at http://www
.environmentamerica.org/sites/environment/files/reports/EA_FrackingNumber
s_scrn.pdf.
50. Id. at 9.
51. Id. at 18.
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this problem. The case of fracking demonstrates once more
that in the absence of comprehensive regulation, industry participants, as narrow self-interest maximizers, will adopt environmentally harmful practices as long as it is cost-effective
from their own narrow perspective. This reality bars the development of environmentally friendly technologies.
2. Tax and Trade Law
Next consider the effect of fiscal laws and regulations. At
first blush, tax law appears to be of little relevance to the present discussion, yet differential tax treatment can be a major
factor in determining the outcome of technological competition.
This can be best seen in the case of greenhouse gas reducing
technologies. There exists broad consensus among scholars that
reduction of greenhouse gas emissions is a laudable social
53
goal. One would expect, therefore, to see government policies
that discourage greenhouse gas emissions. Yet, a careful examination reveals a host of policies that have had the opposite effect. For example, a tax break, popularly known as the “Hummer Loophole,” for businesses purchasing light trucks—a
category that included, inter alia, sport utility vehicles
(SUVs)—was limited after public furor, only to be replaced with
an even more generous 100 percent bonus depreciation for ve54
hicles weighing more than 14,000 pounds. Light trucks and
SUVs consume large amounts of conventional fuels that lead to
greenhouse gas emissions. In light of this fact, one would have
expected to see higher taxes levied on this category of vehicles.
In reality, though, the opposite transpired. As a result, alternative energy sources that were friendlier to the environment
were placed at a disadvantage. Moreover, government funding
of research on the production of liquid fuels petroleum can erect
55
“barriers to low-carbon alternative fuels.”
Another way in which tax law impedes adoption of green
technologies has to do with the rules pertaining to the deprecia52. See Hannah Wiseman & Francis Gradijan, Regulation of Shale Gas
Development, Including Hydraulic Fracturing 4–6 (Univ. of Tulsa Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 2011-11, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn
.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1953547.
53. See Brown & Chandler, supra note 15, at 472–73.
54. Janet Novack, How To Take a 100% Tax Write-Off for a New Porsche,
BMW or Cadillac, FORBES (Apr. 8, 2011, 7:02 PM), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/janetnovack/2011/04/08/how-to-take-a-tax-write-off-for-a-new-porsche
-bmw-or-cadillac.
55. Brown & Chandler, supra note 15, at 476.
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tion of capital investments and the expensing of energy-related
costs. As Marilyn Brown and Sharon Chandler point out, “[i]n
American industry, the current federal tax code discourages
capital investments in general, as opposed to direct expensing
56
of energy costs.” Specifically, the code sets long depreciation
periods, say fifteen years, for energy efficient products, while
providing for much shorter periods of only a few years for ex57
pensing energy-related costs. Consequently, businesses are
disincentivized from investing in energy efficient plants and
buildings that are not considered “direct” energy expenses un58
der the tax code. The divergent depreciation schedules for var59
ious investments “lock in” incumbent technologies and, thus,
retard the rate and distort the path of technological substitu60
tion.
Trade policies may also impact technological choice. The
case of ethanol is an illuminating example. It is commonly believed that biofuels such as ethanol are environmentally friend61
lier than petroleum fuels. Yet, in the United States, ethanol is
62
subject to an import tariff. Like all other trade barriers, the
tariff on importation of ethanol makes it more expensive relative to domestic alternatives, which, in turn, favors domestic
fuel producers while harming consumers. The tariff was adopted by Congress to ensure energy independence. But this commendable motivation does not change the effect of the tariff: it
makes the purchase of ethanol from cheap foreign sources like
Brazil less attractive for American industries. To make matters
56. Id.
57. 26 U.S.C. § 168 (2012).
58. For example, in one study that was conducted in 1996, Jenkins,
Chapman, and Reilly concluded that on account of differential tax treatment,
businesses would be better in terms of the tax implications investing in natural gas-operated plants than in plants using renewable energy sources. ALEC
JENKINS, RICHARD CHAPMAN & HUGH REILLY, CAL. ENERGY COMM’N, TAX
BARRIERS TO FOUR RENEWABLE ELECTRIC GENERATION TECHNOLOGIES
(1996), available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/papers/CEC-999-1996-003. It
should be noted that in light of legal amendments that have been passed after
the study was conducted, it is not clear that its result remains valid.
59. See Gregory C. Unruh, Escaping Carbon Lock-In, 30 ENERGY POL’Y
317, 318 (2002) (discussing institutional sources of lock-in fossil fuel-based
systems).
60. Robin Cowan, Nuclear Power Reactors: A Study in Technological LockIn, 50 J. ECON. HIST. 541, 543–44 (1990) (explaining how markets can get
locked into inferior technologies in early use).
61. Ethanol Facts: Environment, RENEWABLE FUELS ASS’N, http://www
.ethanolrfa.org/pages/ethanol-facts-environment (last updated Mar. 2014).
62. See Brown & Chandler, supra note 15, at 481.
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worse, the United States adopted a policy under which a larger
subsidy is provided by the government to domestic gasoline
63
blenders than to domestic ethanol manufacturers. Together
these policies have the effect of lowering the use of ethanol in
the United States compared to what it could be in their absence.
3. Tort Liability
The design of our tort system presents yet another legal
obstacle to innovative green technologies. As Alex Stein together with one of us pointed out, our tort law displays a strong bias
in favor of customary technologies and, consequently, discour64
ages innovation. To see why, it is imperative to revisit the
principles by which liability is assigned under our tort system.
Not all activities that result in harm give rise to liability; liability attaches only in those cases in which it is determined that
the harm-causing activity fails to meet the “socially acceptable”
65
standard. What is “socially acceptable,” in turn, is largely informed by custom. In other words, courts routinely appeal to
66
custom in deciding whether a defendant was negligent.
The centrality of custom in our torts system can be best
seen in the context of negligence determinations, where by and
large courts tend to equate defendants’ non-compliance with
67
relevant industry customs to negligence. Specifically, courts
generally presume that a defendant who failed to comply with
safety-related customs prevalent in her industry acted negli68
gently. As the Restatement states: “In determining whether
63. Id.
64. Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Torts and Innovation, 107 MICH.
L. REV. 285, 286 (2008) (demonstrating the anti-innovation bias of tort law).
65. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 8, at 12–13 (2000) (describing
tort liability as premised on deviation from acceptable standards); PROSSER
AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 6 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th
ed. 1984) (same).
66. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 65, § 33,
at 193; Clarence Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 1147,
1147–49 (1942) (underscoring the centrality and utility of courts’ reliance on
custom in determining negligence). But see Richard A. Epstein, The Path to
The T.J. Hooper: The Theory and History of Custom in the Law of Tort, 21 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1, 2 (1992) (criticizing modern courts’ tendency to place costbenefit analysis ahead of custom in ascribing liability in torts).
67. David G. Owen, Proving Negligence in Modern Products Liability Litigation, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1003, 1023–24 (2004).
68. See Barbara Kritchevsky, Tort Law Is State Law: Why Courts Should
Distinguish State and Federal Law in Negligence-Per-Se Litigation, 60 AM. U.
L. REV. 71, 88 n.99 (2010).
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conduct is negligent, the customs of the community, or of others
under like circumstances, are factors to be taken into account,
but are not controlling where a reasonable man would not fol69
low them.” The defendant may, of course, attempt to rebut
70
this presumption, but in many cases, as a practical matter,
71
non-compliance with custom often dooms defendants. This is
so because in the absence of proof to the contrary, judges are
empowered to give a directed verdict on the issue of negli72
gence.
Similarly, custom plays a key role in product liability cas73
es. Here, too, courts use custom as a reference point in assessing whether the defendant’s product design was safe. A
manufacturer’s compliance with the relevant industrial custom
is admissible as evidence tending to prove that its product was
74
safe. Conversely, a manufacturer’s failure to conform to custom constitutes evidence suggesting the presence of a defect in
75
its product. Hence, any deviation from industry customs runs
the risk of a finding that the product was defective. These fac76
tors are outcome determinative both under the “risk-utility”

69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 295A, at 62 (1965); see also FED.
R. EVID. 406 (noting that customs and routine practices are admissible as evidence to prove action was in conformity with those practices).
70. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 295A cmts. b, c, at 62–63 (“If
the actor does what others do under like circumstances, there is at least a possible inference that he is conforming to the community standard of reasonable
conduct; and if he does not do what others do, there is a possible inference that
he is not so conforming. . . . [W]here there is nothing in the situation or in
common experience to lead to the contrary conclusion, this inference may be so
strong as to call for a directed verdict, one way or the other, on the issue of
negligence. . . . Any such custom is . . . not necessarily conclusive . . . . Customs
which are entirely reasonable under the ordinary circumstances which give
rise to them may become quite unreasonable in the light of a single fact in the
particular case.”).
71. This practice has an obvious explanation: custom integrates the conventional wisdom—a decisional shortcut which is both easy and sensible to
apply without generating much controversy over the court’s decision. See
DOBBS, supra note 65, § 164, at 395–96; PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS, supra note 65, § 33, at 193–94.
72. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 295A cmt. b, at 62–63.
73. See David G. Owen, Proof of Product Defect, 93 KY. L.J. 1, 5–10 (2004)
(documenting massive use of industry customs as a benchmark for determining design defects in product liability actions).
74. Id. at 8–9.
75. Id. at 7.
76. See DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW § 5.7, at 303–04 (2005).
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and “consumer expectation” tests that are used by the courts
to decide product liability cases.
The combined effect of these tort rules is to subsidize conventional practices and technologies. At the same time, the custom rules expose innovators and adopters of new technologies
to an increased risk of liability. The heavy reliance on custom
and conventional technologies makes it more difficult for green
innovation to succeed in the marketplace. The custom rules
create a strong evidential association between any damage resulting from the firm’s activities and its adoption of new technologies that break away from the conventional wisdom. Naturally, innovators critically depend on the adoption of their novel
products and processes by market actors. Failure in the marketplace means that considerable resources expended on research and development will be lost. The fact that innovative
technologies expose adopters to a heightened risk of legal liability serves as a disincentive to choose green technologies over
conventional ones. This means that when a green technology is
not better than a conventional rival by a margin that is large
78
enough to offset the heighted risk, it will not be adopted. As a
consequence, many green technologies will either be produced
79
and fail in the marketplace or not be produced at all.
A case in point is green construction. Fear of liability de80
layed the adoption of green construction techniques. Of particular concern was the implied warranty of quality that ap81
plies to construction of new units. Initially, there existed
significant “uncertainty over whether the construction quality
of newly constructed green homes will be measured on the
same standards as conventionally constructed homes or (more
likely) a much higher standard which incorporates the expecta-

77. Id. § 5.6, at 295.
78. We do not argue, of course, that green technologies will never be produced or adopted. Such an argument evidently fails. Our claim is different. We
argue that in all those cases in which the green innovation does not offer potential adopters benefits or cost savings that are significant enough to offset
the legal risk differential, it will not succeed in the real world, or, worse, not
be produced at all.
79. See Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 64, at 287–89; see also Porter
& van der Linde, supra note 17 (discussing innovation offsets related to environmental regulations).
80. See Jeffrey D. Masters & John R. Musitano Jr., Managing Liability
Risks in Green Construction, 30 L.A. LAW. 17, 17 (2007).
81. See Hirokawa, supra note 35, at 521 n.100, 523 (discussing the implied warranty of quality).
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tions attendant to ‘high performance’ homes.” Similar is the
story with innovative water technologies that could completely
do away with the use of the air pollutant perchloroethylene, the
main solvent used by the dry cleaning industry. Adoption of
cleaner technologies has faced setbacks due to “dry clean only”
consumer labelling standards that pre-date current technologies and end up imposing a risk of liability on cleaners that use
83
innovative water technologies.
In addition to impeding adoption of green technologies, the
custom rules distort the direction of technological progress. The
heightened risk of liability for tort damages induces innovators
to confine their inventive endeavors to the conventional technological frameworks, instead of focusing upon inventions that
can lead to genuine environmental breakthroughs. The dynamic efficiency loss occasioned by the custom rules may be far
greater than it seems. By preventing certain inventions from
ever being produced, the custom rules deprive society not only
of those particular inventions but also of many subsequent innovations. This is especially true in cumulative innovation set84
tings, in which new inventions rely on preexisting ones.
B. ECONOMIC BARRIERS
Legal barriers aside, green technologies may be passed up
on account of pure economic, or business, considerations. Let it
be clear that we do not suggest that firms shun green technologies on principle, out of pure animosity. On the contrary, we believe that, in principle, corporations are bottom-line oriented
organizations. Accordingly, their tendency would be to adopt
any innovation that can increase their profits. Yet, green innovation often displays certain characteristics that may repel
conventional firms. Specifically, green innovation often imposes
high switching costs on adopters, so it is perceived as riskier
than conventional alternatives and it is considered “disruptive”
85
of established business models. In the proceeding paragraphs,
we will elaborate on each of these effects.
82. Id. at 523.
83. ENVTL. LAW INST., supra note 43, at 2–4.
84. On cumulative innovation, see generally Howard F. Chang, Patent
Scope, Antitrust Policy, and Cumulative Innovation, 26 THE RAND J. ECON.
34, 36 (1995) (providing an example of the cumulative innovation paradigm as
applied to Westinghouse v. Boyden Power Brake Co., 170 U.S. 537 (1898)).
85. We do not argue that these characteristics (or problems) are unique to
green innovation. They may be displayed by non-green or conventional innovation as well. However, green innovation creates unique beneficial effects to our
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1. Switching Costs, Decision Horizons, and Path Dependency
Recent studies in economics demonstrate that even rela86
tively small switching costs may create strong lock-in effects.
For example, studies have shown that the need to incur a relatively minor cost of 150 to 240 dollars in order to switch from
one cellular phone provider to another may cause users to stick
87
with their current provider, notwithstanding the fact that
changing providers could have yielded them considerable long88
term benefits.
In short, the presence of switching cost may doom efficient
changes. In the case of green technologies the problem is exacerbated by the fact that the cost of switching from a conventional technology to a greener one may be quite substantial. As
a result, even CEOs of companies who harbor an ideological
preference for green technologies may elect not to use them.
To comprehend the potential magnitude of this problem,
imagine a power plant that operates on coal or fossil fuels and
considers switching to a cleaner source of energy, say, bio-fuels.
Changing the underlying production technology would require
the proprietor to overhaul its plant. The one-time investment
necessary to affect the change may very well stop the initiative
dead in its tracks, even though it may very well prove itself to
be cost-justifiable in the long run. Indeed, this problem may
well explain the persistence of coal-operated power plants in
89
the real world. Hence, in the absence of legal or financial insociety and consequently society should be more concerned with barriers to the
adoption of green innovation.
86. NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCS., DEP’T OF TRADE & INDUS., SWITCHING COSTS: PART ONE: ECONOMIC MODELS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 10, 25,
31
(2003),
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140402142426/
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/comp_policy/oft655.pdf.
87. Patrick Xavier & Dimitri Ypsilanti, Switching Costs and Consumer
Behaviour: Implications for Telecommunications Regulation, 10 INFO 25 (2008)
(discussing the extent to which telecommunication users switch and why); see
also Juan Pablo Maicas et al., Reducing the Level of Switching Costs in Mobile
Communications: The Case of Mobile Number Portability, 33 TELECOMM.
POL’Y 544 (2009) (explaining the effect of regulation on switching costs for mobile phone users); NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCS., supra note 86, at 10–11;
Damon Darlin, The High Cost of Loving Your Phone, N.Y. TIMES (June 11,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/13/technology/13every.html (describing switching costs for mobile phone users).
88. NAT’L ECON. RESEARCH ASSOCS., supra note 86, at 10.
89. For a report on existing and planned coal-based power plants, see The
Ctr. for Media & Democracy, Existing U.S. Coal Plants, SOURCEWATCH (June
1, 2012), http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Existing_U.S._Coal_
Plants. Also, for a report on new coal-based power plants under development,
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centive to switch to greener production, companies will often
prefer to stick with the status quo ante and live (and die) with
the technology they have been using for years.
The switching cost effect is compounded by the decision horizons problem that inflicts corporate thinking. The private
(and social) benefits of green technologies are often spread out
over long periods of time. For example, the switch to a cleaner
production technology may yield moderate cost savings every
year. In the long haul, these amounts may dramatically increase the profits of the adopting corporation. But herein lies
the rub. CEOs and corporate management typically do not have
the same horizon as the shareholders—let alone the rest of our
society. Corporations are run by agents seeking to maximize
their own self-interest, not that of our society at large. This fact
has two important implications for the present analysis. First,
corporate decision making will not take into account environmental benefits that do not contribute to the firm’s bottom-line.
Second, corporate management will tend to favor short-term
performance over long-term performance.
The former point is well known; the latter requires elabo90
ration. In the era of performance-based remuneration, the
management of corporations will strive to maximize short-term
91
profits. Under the prevailing compensation paradigm, the better the short-term performance, the higher the rewards for
management. The long-term fate of the enterprise is of little interest to the presiding management. This means that the management would be very averse to sacrifice short-term profits for
long-term success. Society’s perspective is very different, of
course. Society’s planning horizon is much longer than that of
the management and its interests are more varied. From a societal perspective, investments that yield long-term benefits
should be made by corporations. But society does not get to decide. Hence, some form of intervention that more closely aligns
see ERIK SHUSTER, DEP’T OF ENERGY, TRACKING NEW COAL-FIRED POWER
PLANTS (2011), http://www.netl.doe.gov/coal/refshelf/ncp.pdf.
90. Sandeep Kapur & Allan Timmermann, Relative Performance Evaluation Contracts and Asset Market Equilibrium, 115 ECON. J. 1077, 1077 (2005).
91. See John M. Abowd, Does Performance-Based Managerial Compensation Affect Corporate Performance?, 43 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 52 (1990) (analyzing corporate performance and compensation under a performance-based
remuneration model); see also Rajiv D. Banker et al., A Field-Study of the Impact of a Performance-Based Incentive Plan, 21 J. ACCT. & ECON. 195 (1996)
(describing a comprehensive management accounting field study of a performance-based compensation plan in the retail arena, and its positive corporate
results).
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the private interest of management with that of the rest of society is desirable in this context.
Finally, transition to a newer, greener technology is severely curtailed even when the switching costs or decision horizons
effect is minimal, because of the “path-dependent, coevolutionary” processes through which conventional energy so92
lutions have found entrenchment. Large technological systems
such as electricity generation, distribution, and end use have to
be visualized as part of a techno-institutional complex (TIC),
embedded in a social and institutional setting comprising of
other public and private actors, rather than as “discrete techno93
logical artifacts.” The initial adoption of a certain technology
and its continued application are not so much the product of an
optimization decision by rational economic actors as much as
the outcome of “a path-dependent process in which timing,
strategy and historic circumstance, as much as optimality, de94
termine the winner.” Once a dominant design survives in the
market, firms focus on incremental innovation that locks them
into this design and shy away from alternatives that render the
95
design obsolete.
The more impactful lock-in, though, is at the institutional
level, because of positive network externalities that make the
technology more valuable to users. When there is higher interindustry dependence on a technology, it is normally reinforced
by private commercial institutions that finance the operationalization of such technology, and by educational institutions that
disseminate knowledge pertaining to the same. Soon, institutional standards and conventions develop around the technology, in order to reduce or eliminate uncertainties that can ham96
per its further growth. Unions and industry associations
97
emerge to represent workers employed in its production. Even
media opinion and social behavior co-evolve with the technolo98
gy. Finally, all this momentum leads to formal recognition of
the technology by governmental institutions. The last phase is
particularly locking-in in its effects because it has the potential
92. Gregory C. Unruh, Understanding Carbon Lock-In, 28 ENERGY POL’Y
817, 818 (2000).
93. Id.
94. Id. at 820.
95. For detailed discussion, see infra Part I.B.3.
96. Unruh, supra note 92, at 822.
97. Id. at 823–24.
98. Id. at 824.
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to “override market forces,” and survive in its initial form “for
extended periods” due to the delays and uncertainties inherent
99
in the political process. In short, the technology, over time,
pervades the larger economic, social, and political system, thus
gradually but totally resulting in institutional lock-ins. Energy
markets are especially prone to technology lock-in because of
the perfect substitutability of the end product, electricity, from
different technologies. This also prevents new, cleaner technologies from internalizing the value of future learning into the
100
product price.
2. Risk Aversion and First Mover Disadvantage
Another significant obstacle to the adoption of green technologies is risk aversion. This factor especially pertains to
green technologies that deviate from established patterns. The
more path-breaking a technology is the higher the risk that
may be associated with it. And, the higher the risk, the higher
needs to be the expected reward for the technology to be adopt101
ed. Concern with risk is a paramount aspect of the business
102
world. Yet, it puts new technologies (both green and brown)
at an inherent disadvantage relative to technologies that have
been used for extended periods of time and improvements on
103
such technologies. Simply put, firms possess much better information on the performance of conventional technology.
One should not underestimate the risk presented for corporations by new technologies. Technological changes run the risk
of various malfunctions. The risk may be big or small, but in
the absence of real world experience with the technology it may
be very difficult to know. As a result, each firm would rather
have another company adopt the technology first. However,
99. Id. at 824–25.
100. Matthias Kalkuhl et al., Learning or Lock-In: Optimal Technology
Policies To Support Mitigation, 34 RESOURCE & ENERGY ECON. 1, 10 (2012).
101. George S. Day & Paul J.H. Schoemaker, Innovating in Uncertain
Markets: 10 Lessons for Green Technologies, 52 MIT SLOAN MGMT. REV. 37
(2011), available at http://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/innovating-in-uncertain
-markets-10-lessons-for-green-technologies.
102. PETER L. BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE GODS: THE REMARKABLE STORY OF
RISK 1–8, 192–93, 246 (1998); see also Charles A. Holt & Susan K. Laury, Risk
Aversion and Incentive Effects, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 1644 (2002) (describing the
risk aversion business paradigm and the incentives that make it shift).
103. Kenneth Gillingham & James Sweeney, Market Failure and the Structure of Externalities, in HARNESSING RENEWABLE ENERGY 69, 74–75 (A. Jorge
Padilla & Richard Schmalensee eds., 2010), available at http://www.yale.edu/
gillingham/GillinghamSweeney_MktFailureStructureExternalities_proof.pdf.
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since all firms share the same preference vis-à-vis one another,
104
the technology may not be adopted at all.
The problem may also be stated in a slightly different way:
adoption of new technologies frequently creates a first mover
disadvantage. The first adopter of a new technology absorbs the
risk of failure for all other market participants. The first mover
will have to deal with the cost of addressing the problems that
arise over time, especially in the early stages, while its rivals
can follow from afar and assess the new technology. The first
mover disadvantage is very small when the technology at issue
is an improvement of a preexisting technology. But it is very
significant when the new technology at issue departs from the
105
accepted paradigm, as many green technologies do. The first
mover disadvantage problem is especially acute when implementation of a green technology requires significant investment in infrastructure as is often the case in the transportation
106
sector.
3. Disruption of Accepted Business Models
In his important book, The Innovator’s Dilemma, Clayton
Christensen explained how disruptive technologies can be the
107
bane of successful, established corporations. Disruptive technologies are cheaper than established technologies. In the
beginning, they offer a lower performance alternative to the
104. ADAM B. JAFFE ET AL., RES. FOR THE FUTURE, A TALE OF TWO MARKET
FAILURES: TECHNOLOGY AND ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 6 (2004), available at
http://www.rff.org/documents/rff-dp-04-38.pdf.
105. Id. at 7.
106. The shift to cleaner or smarter transportation necessitates massive
investment in infrastructure, such as charging construction of advanced railroads or provision of new energy sources. In this case, the government must
step in and provide the infrastructure as it does with other public goods. See
CHARLES WHEELAN, NAKED ECONOMICS: UNDRESSING THE DISMAL SCIENCE
54–103 (2002); Adam B. Jaffe et al., A Tale of Two Market Failures: Technology and Environmental Policy, 54 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 164, 169, 172–73 (2005);
Alan Williams, The Optimal Provision of Public Goods in a System of Local
Government, 74 J. POL. ECON. 18 (1966). Alternatively, a private company can
step in and provide the necessary infrastructure. In fact, this is exactly what
Google did in the case of smart cars. Google harnessed its “Street View” functionality to enable the operation of driverless cars that are supposed to reduce
the pollution associated with private transportation. John Markoff, Google
Cars Drive Themselves, in Traffic, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2010), http://www
.nytimes.com/2010/10/10/science/10google.html. For a broader discussion of the
topic, see Theodore Bergstrom et al., On the Private Provision of Public Goods,
29 J. PUB. ECON. 25 (1986), and R. H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17
J.L. & ECON. 357, 358–59, 375–76 (1974).
107. CHRISTENSEN, supra note 11, at xxiii, 117–38, 264.
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dominant technology and thus do not appeal to high margin
108
Over time, though, disruptive technologies
consumers.
improve rapidly without a marked cost increase and ultimately
109
they outperform and supersede established technologies.
Digital photography is perhaps the best example of a disruptive
110
technology.
Perversely, dominant firms are especially vulnerable to the
emergence of disruptive technologies since they are deeply
invested in the established technology and their entire business
model is predicated on it. This happens in sequential stages.
Scale economies result in significant ‘sunk costs’ in the
dominant design, and this is soon followed by learning effects
or “learning by doing” that leads to improvisation and
111
With increased
innovation in the production process.
adoption of the design, adaptive expectations arise because of
reduced uncertainty in the design. Worse yet, initially the
disruptive technology has little “market pull” and, hence,
dominant firms are reluctant to switch for fear of losing their
112
clientele. Kodak-Easterman’s handling—or more accurately,
mishandling—of digital photography provides a sad, yet
powerful example of the approach of established corporations to
113
disruptive innovation.
While not all green technologies fall into the category of
disruptive innovation, many of them do. Green innovation often
challenges accepted production paradigms and long-standing
114
After all, it is the very essence of green
profit models.

108. Id. at xvii.
109. Erwin Danneels, Disruptive Technology Reconsidered: A Critique and
Research Agenda, 21 J. PRODUCT INNOVATION MGMT. 246, 247 (2004).
110. David W. Cravens et al., The Innovation Challenges of Proactive Cannibalisation and Discontinuous Technologies, 14 EUR. BUS. REV. 257, 260
(2002).
111. STEVEN D. LEVITT ET AL., TOWARD AN UNDERSTANDING OF LEARNING
BY DOING: EVIDENCE FROM AN AUTOMOBILE ASSEMBLY PLANT 1 (2013), available at http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/chad.syverson/research/learningbydoing
.pdf.
112. Timothy J. Foxon, Technological Lock-In and the Role of Innovation,
in HANDBOOK OF SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 140, 142 (Giles Atkinson et al.
eds., 2007).
113. Henry C. Lucas Jr. & Jie Mein Goh, Disruptive Technology: How Kodak Missed the Digital Photography Revolution, 18 J. STRATEGIC INFO. SYS. 46
(2009).
114. See Matt Rogers, Energy = Innovation: 10 Disruptive Technologies,
MCKINSEY ON SUSTAINABILITY & RESOURCE PRODUCTIVITY (2012), http://www
.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/dotcom/client_service/
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technologies to offer cleaner, environmentally friendlier
products and processes that often represent a paradigm shift
115
Consequently,
relative to the predominant technology.
established corporations may initially ignore green inventions
and subsequently, as they gain a foothold in the market, even
fight them. The attitude of the American automobile industry
to electric cars is a case in point. The idea of an electric car has
116
been floating around for years. Yet, it took car manufacturers
117
several decades to warm up to it. Auto manufacturers whose
profit model in the last decades heavily relied on powerful,
albeit fuel-inefficient vehicles refused to buy into the concept of
118
The fact that electric cars were
electricity-operated cars.
119
slower than fuel-operated cars did not help matters. It took a
massive increase in gas prices and global economic crisis to
cause the United States car industry to reconsider its approach
to electric cars, and even so, it will probably take a few more
120
decades until such cars become the standard.
sustainability/pdfs/mck%20on%20srp/srp_02_innovation.ashx (describing contemporary disruptive technologies in the environmental field).
115. THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 85
(3d ed. 1996).
116. Electric vehicles were actually the dominant form of motor vehicles in
America during the mid to late nineteenth century. DAVID A. KIRSCH, THE
ELECTRIC VEHICLE AND THE BURDEN OF HISTORY 37–41 (2000). After electric
vehicles fell out of favor due to the development of the internal combustion engine, multiple oil crises and environmental concerns in the 1970s pushed alternative fuel vehicles into the public consciousness. This led to a revival in
interest in electric cars during the second half of the twentieth century. Id. at
204.
117. Id. at 203–08.
118. Id.; see also Adam Hartung, Why Tesla Is Beating GM, Ford and Toyota – Electric Cars, FORBES (July 11, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
adamhartung/2012/07/11/why-tesla-is-beating-gm-ford-and-toyota-at-electric
-cars (detailing how auto manufacturers are reluctant even today to truly
adopt the electric car).
119. For electric vehicles to sustain high speeds past twenty miles per
hour, the battery must be able to meet the rapidly increasing electric power
requirements. KIRSCH, supra note 116, at 106–07. Thus, it required the development of better batteries for electric cars to compete with the top speeds from
gas powered vehicles. During the early 1970s, it was theorized that a massproduced electric car would have a range of fifty miles at a speed of fifty miles
per hour. John O’M. Bockris, The Case for Electric and Fuel-Cell Powered Vehicles, 3 AMBIO 15, 21 (1974).
120. See Brad Plumer, As Battery Prices Drop, Will Electric Cars Finally
Catch On?, WASH. POST WONKBLOG (July 12, 2012), http://www
.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2012/07/12/as-battery-prices-drop
-will-electric-cars-finally-catch-on (suggesting that because the price competitiveness of electric cars is tied to the cost of batteries, it will take some time

PARCHOMOVSKY_4fmt

2015]

1/6/2015 2:22 PM

THE GREEN OPTION

993

The challenge green technologies present for established
121
corporations is compounded by the “not our idea” mentality.
Research in behavioral psychology shows that individuals and
corporations tend to over-evaluate their own ideas and under122
estimate the ideas of other people. Accordingly, corporations
that developed the technology that currently holds sway on the
market, or even licensed it, may be especially reluctant to give
green technologies a try, especially if they were not developed
123
in-house. Thus, a chemical plant may steadfastly adhere to
environmentally harmful manufacturing processes that it has
used for a year, refusing to consider greener alternatives.
Having reviewed the various legal and business obstacles
green companies face, in the next Part we proceed to introduce
a new mechanism that may alleviate many of the roadblocks
we discussed and give green technologies a better chance of
making it in the marketplace.
II. WHAT CAN BROWN DO FOR YOU?
All else being equal, from a societal vantage point, environmentally friendly technology should be preferred to environmentally harmful, or even environmentally neutral, tech124
nologies. And in a world with an omniscient beneficent social
planner the correct technological choice would be made. In reality, however, technological choices are not made by a central
planner. Rather, they are largely left to the market, or more accurately, to the firms operating in it.
The technology choices of private firms are likely to diverge
from the socially optimal choice. The cost-benefit analysis performed by a firm is different from that of society at large. As
profit-maximizing entities, firms will likely adopt production
before electric cars will be able to compete against regular internal combustion
engine vehicles).
121. DAN ARIELY, THE UPSIDE OF IRRATIONALITY: THE UNEXPECTED BENEFITS OF DEFYING LOGIC AT WORK AND AT HOME 107–22 (2010) (discussing the
phenomenon of actors overvaluing their own ideas and creations).
122. Id.
123. See Bryan Kent Bollinger, Green Technology Adoption in Response To
Environmental Policies 1 (June 2011) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Stanford
University),
available
at
https://stacks.stanford.edu/file/druid:kw873vh9740/Green%20Technology%
20Adoption-augmented.pdf.
124. See Jonathan M.W.W. Chu, Developing and Diffusing Green Technologies: The Impact of Intellectual Property Rights and Their Justification, 4
WASH. & LEE J. ENERGY, CLIMATE & ENV’T 53, 60–62 (2013).
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technology that guarantees them the highest possible expected
net payoff, even when the choice is socially suboptimal. Moreover, firms will adopt profit-maximizing strategies even when
125
those strategies impose costs on society at large. Indeed, the
indifference toward social costs gave birth to the law and economics movement. Left to their own devices, profit maximizing
firms will not take account of environmental harms as long as
those harms do not negatively affect their profits. This misalignment between the private calculus performed by firms and
that of society at large is the standard justification for legal in126
tervention in the marketplace.
Generally speaking, legal intervention can take the form of
127
a stick or carrot. The paradigmatic example of the former is
regulation. Regulation tends to be negative in nature. It proscribes actors from taking certain action under the threat of le128
Private litigation is another form of a
gal punishment.
129
“stick.” The norms of private law make certain deviations
from socially desirable standards actionable and entrust private litigants and courts with the task of disciplining viola-

125. See James Halteman, Externalities and the Coase Theorem: A Diagrammatic Presentation, 36 J. ECON. EDUC. 385, 385 (2005); see also WILLIAM
J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, ECONOMICS, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, AND
THE QUALITY OF LIFE 75–79 (1979) (noting that “the price system does not act
as an efficient servant of the public’s preferences” when there are significant
externalities).
126. See BAUMOL & OATES, supra note 125, at 230–32; PIGOU, supra note
42, at 134; cf. Coase, supra note 14, at 15 (arguing that if there are no transaction costs, legal interventions into the marketplace may not be necessary to fix
this misalignment because the relevant parties would always bargain with one
another to reach the socially optimal level of environmental harms).
127. See generally James Andreoni et al., The Carrot or the Stick: Rewards,
Punishments, and Cooperation, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 893 (2003) (examining
punishments and rewards in economic laboratory experiments).
128. See Dorothy Thornton et al., General Deterrence and Corporate Environmental Behavior, 27 LAW & POL’Y 262, 262 (2005) (explaining how regulatory programs depend on formal prosecutions and legal sanctions against violators to create a deterrence threat); see also Andrew Green, You Can’t Pay
Them Enough: Subsidies, Environmental Law, and Social Norms, 30 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. 407, 424 (2006) (describing government regulations as
“sticks”).
129. See Stefanie Fleischer Seldin, A Strategy for Advocacy on Behalf of
Women Offenders, 5 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 21 (1995) (“[L]itigation is a
good ‘stick.’”); see also Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experiments, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 980 (2000) (providing
evidence based on experimental data that there is a widespread willingness to
punish those that free ride and abuse social norms).
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130

tors. Alternatively, society may use “carrots” to induce actors
to behave in socially desirable ways. An oft-cited example of a
131
“carrot” is a subsidy. A subsidy consists of a direct or indirect
transfer of money from the public fisc to a private actor to re132
133
ward a certain behavior. Tax breaks and prizes may be
used to the same effect.
In the paragraphs to come, we present a novel mechanism—the green option—that falls outside the conventional
tools used by lawmakers to channel the behavior of market actors. Our mechanism is uniquely designed to harness the profit
motivation of firms to facilitate the success of green companies.
Moreover, the implementation of our mechanism requires a
fairly minimal intervention in the operation of markets and no
ongoing monitoring.
A. THE GREEN OPTION
The discussion in Part I demonstrated that green technologies face a myriad of legal and market barriers. Although we
clearly do not suggest that established firms are directly responsible for erecting these barriers, it is clear that such firms
can facilitate the introduction of green technologies and contribute to their success in the marketplace. Indeed, small companies that produce environmentally friendly inventions can
dramatically benefit from partnering up with larger, more es134
tablished firms. The advantages that strategic business partners offer to small, startup firms are real and significant and
can be the difference between success and failure.
130. See John C.P. Goldberg, Introduction: Pragmatism and Private Law,
125 HARV. L. REV. 1640, 1640 (2012).
131. See Harry Moren, Note, The Difficulty of Fencing In Interstate Emissions: EPA’s Clean Air Interstate Rule Fails To Make Good Neighbors, 36
ECOLOGY L.Q. 525, 542 (2009) (“[A] government subsidy is a carrot.”); see also
Green, supra note 128, at 424 (describing government subsidies as “carrots”).
132. 13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531.10.1, at 7 (Supp. 2014) (“A tax ‘break’ often is economically and
functionally indistinguishable from a direct payment. Among the examples
was this: a state that wishes to subsidize the ownership of crucifixes could buy
and distribute them, or reimburse private purchases, or give a tax credit for
the purchase price.”).
133. For discussion on the use of prizes to induce innovation, see Steven
Shavell & Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights,
44 J.L. & ECON. 525 (2001).
134. See, e.g., TERESA GORBETT ET AL., UNDERSTANDING THE BUSINESS RATIONALE BEHIND THE TREND TOWARDS ENVIRONMENTALLY FRIENDLY MANUFACTURING PRACTICES 16–17 (2005), available at https://www.wm.edu/as/
publicpolicy/documents/prs/green.pdf.
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Naturally, in light of the difference in market positions,
there exists a large disparity in the bargaining power between
established and startup firms. As a result, it is the large established corporations that get to decide whether to give a chance
to green technologies, and if so, under what conditions. Under
the extant regime, large corporations are under no obligation to
endorse environmental innovations, and green companies can
do little besides hope that their products offer cost savings sufficient enough to attract the attention of their larger peers. Society at large currently plays no part in this dynamic, despite
its unequivocal interest in promoting environmentally friendly
135
products and processes.
Yet society need not stay on the sidelines and hope that the
market will yield socially desirable outcomes, especially when
so much is at stake and the market is imperfect. A simple
change in the law can go a long way toward transforming the
current reality and give green innovation a much better chance
at market success. Specifically, we propose that green companies will be granted the power to transfer a call option for five
percent of their shares to an established company of their
choice. For the purpose of our proposal, any publically traded
company will be considered an established company. The option
will be granted to the established company for free and its exercise price will be set to equal the value of the green company’s share at the time of the transfer. It will be open for a period of five years. However, unlike the case with standard call
options, the receiving company will not be able to simply allow
the call option to expire at the end of the five-year period. Rather, it will be forced to exercise the option at that time. We call
this policy tool “the green option.”
A numerical example can illustrate how the green option
would work. Assume that on August 1, 2012, ClearTech Inc.
wishes to take advantage of the green option by transferring a
call option for five percent of the company—or 1,000,000
shares—to BrownWater Co. At the time of the transfer, the
value of each of ClearTech’s shares was estimated at $2. The
transfer of the option will not expose BrownWater to an immediate financial liability. BrownWater receives the option for
free. It will only have to pay the exercise price—in our case, $2
per share—when it decides to exercise the option. For simplicity’s sake, we will assume that BrownWater chooses to wait the
135. See Marilyn A. Brown, Market Failures and Barriers As a Basis for
Clean Energy Policies, 29 ENERGY POL’Y 1197, 1201 (2001).
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full five years and exercises the option on August 1, 2017. At
this moment, it will have to pay $2 million ($2 x 1,000,000) to
GreenTech. If the value of GreenTech quadrupled between
2012 and 2017, such that each share is now worth $8, then
136
BrownWater will have netted $6 million. If, by contrast, the
value of each of GreenTech’s shares dropped to $1 by the exer137
cise date, then BrownWater will lose $1 million.
The proposed mechanism creates a partial alignment between the interests of established and green technology companies. Its point and purpose is to give established companies a
financial stake in green technology and then harness their profit motive to promote the technologies in which they are invested. By empowering green companies to transfer an option on
their stocks to established businesses, we will allow them to
forge strategic partnerships with established corporations.
Such strategic partnerships could be invaluable for green com138
panies. Indeed, they may well make the difference between
success and failure in the marketplace.
Having a financial stake in a green company will prompt
established businesses to promote the environmental technologies offered by the smaller startup firm. And although the profit (or loss) the established firm stands to gain (or lose) from the
green venture may be small by comparison to other revenue
streams it generates, we can make it significant enough so that
it cannot be ignored even by successful large firms. It should be
noted in this context that recent research in behavioral psychology demonstrated that even relatively small financial incentives may have a profound effect on behavior and decision
139
making. In line with this finding, we believe that by making
established businesses stakeholders in green technologies,

136. It paid $2 million for shares whose current worth is $8 million.
137. In this case, it is paying $2 million for shares that are worth only half
of this amount, namely $1 million.
138. For an in-depth analysis on how strategic partnerships can benefit
small technology firms, see David B. Audretsch & Maryann P. Feldman,
Small-Firm Strategic Research Partnerships: The Case of Biotechnology, 15
TECH. ANALYSIS & STRATEGIC MGMT. 273 (2003); Rachel Sheinbein, Why
Cleantech Startups Need To Partner with Big Companies, FORBES (Sept. 26,
2011, 4:55 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/ciocentral/2011/09/26/why-bigcompanies-need-to-partner-with-cleantech-startups.
139. ARIELY, supra note 121, at 17–52 (discussing experiments that show
that small incentives can lead to better performance than very large ones).
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lawmakers can transform their attitude toward such technolo140
gies and turn them into agents of social change.
As far as green companies are concerned, our mechanism
creates a win-win situation. Our proposal gives green companies complete discretion to decide whether to take advantage of
the green option. From the vantage point of the green companies, the mechanism we propose is completely optional. Green
companies can decide to use it or forego it, depending on their
particular circumstances. A green company that prefers to “go
it alone” or one that already has a strategic partner is at liberty
not to use the mechanism. By contrast, a green company that
can benefit from transferring a call option to an established
business will have the unilateral power to do so. In effect, the
green option adds another possibility to the menu of legal pow141
ers available to green companies, without taking anything
away from that menu. Since there are significant differences
among green firms in terms of their business models and financing potential, we expect that some of them will take advantage of the new power we bestow upon them while others
will not. In other words, green companies will self-select
whether to use the new legal option and a separating equilibri142
um will result.
The same cannot be said about established firms. From the
vantage point of established firms, the green option constitutes
an imposition. It forces them to take an interest in an environmental company or technology that they may not have invested
in otherwise, or may have taken under more favorable terms.
Hence, although our proposal creates a potential upside for the
established firm, it is undeniable that the upside is accompanied by a risk. In defense of our proposal, it must be said that
we have come a long way from the laissez faire ideology that
dominated political thought at the end of the nineteenth and

140. It should be added that the financial interest of the established businesses in the green companies will not necessarily terminate at the end of the
option’s life. The established businesses will continue to have a stake in the
green companies as long as they hold the stock. This interest will be terminated with the sale of the stock. This event, however, may take place many years
into the future.
141. Ian Ayres, Menus Matter, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 3 (2006) (defining
menu as, “a contractual offer that empowers the offeree to accept more than
one type of contract”).
142. That is, in equilibrium, not all companies will act alike; or in economic
parlance, they will not pool together.
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143

beginning of the twentieth century. Today, firms must comply
with multiple laws and regulations that restrict their freedom
144
of choice.
Nonetheless, in order to protect established firms from potential opportunism on the part of green entrepreneurs, we introduce two important limitations on the power of green companies to use the green option. First, in order to reduce the risk
to receiving firms, we propose that the green option will only be
available to startups that have been in existence for at least
five years and have commercialized their core green technology.
The point and purpose of this limitation is to filter out the
startups that carry the highest risk of failure, those in the first
145
few years of their existence. In addition, we would make the
green option available only to companies that produce the
green technology they developed—or put differently, commercialized. The commercialization requirement is important for
two reasons: it reduces the risk to the receiving company, and it
146
enhances the likelihood of a future benefit to society at large.
The commercialization requirement is important for another
reason: commercialization signals seriousness and that the
green investors are really committed to their venture.
Second, we would exempt established firms that have already voluntarily partnered up with green companies or developed a similar green technology “in house” from taking the
green option. These companies will, of course, be at liberty to
make an additional investment in green companies should they
143. For a history of laissez faire, see HAROLD U. FAULKNER, THE DECLINE
OF LAISSEZ FAIRE, 1897–1917 (1951); JACOB VINER, ESSAYS ON THE INTELLECTUAL HISTORY OF ECONOMICS (Douglas A. Irwin ed., 1991).
144. For a discussion of the many ways that firms are regulated, see Colin
Scott, Regulation in the Age of Governance: The Rise of the Post-Regulatory
State, in THE POLITICS OF REGULATION: INSTITUTIONS AND REGULATORY REFORMS FOR THE AGE OF GOVERNANCE 145, 160–66 (Jacint Jordana & David
Levi-Faur eds., 2004).
145. For a discussion on the correlation between “years of existence” or
“age” and the “likelihood of success” for startup companies, see Sue Birley, The
Role of New Firms: Births, Deaths and Job Generation, 7 STRATEGIC MGMT. J.
361, 363–64, 368–69 (1986); Josef Brüderl & Rudolf Schüssler, Organizational
Mortality: The Liabilities of Newness and Adolescence, 35 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 530
(1990).
146. Ted Sichelman explains in his article, Commercializing Patents, how
commercializing an invention into a viable product is a costly and risky development process. Ted Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV.
341, 343 (2010). Thus, it is logical to assume that once an invention has been
transformed into a commercial product, the overall risk associated with that
invention is reduced because it was able to overcome a significant hurdle.
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choose to do so. But they will be under no legal obligation to accept the green option if it is offered to them. The point of our
proposal is to get as many established companies as possible
involved in the promotion of green technologies. Companies
that chose to invest in green technologies on their own accord
already bear their fair share of the burden. In addition, the
proposed exemption has the salutary effect of incentivizing
firms to actively search for the most promising green technologies and invest in them, rather than sit passively and wait until an environmental startup forces them, under the terms of
our scheme, to take a financial interest in it.
B. TAKING STOCK
The implementation of our proposal will yield several important benefits for green companies, as well as for society at
large. We will conduct our analysis of these benefits from three
different perspectives: a business perspective, a political perspective, and a societal perspective.
1. The Business Perspective
Forming a strategic allegiance with an established business may dramatically increase the odds of success for green
companies. Once a green company transfers an option on its
shares to an established business in accordance with our proposal, the receiving company will have an incentive to see the
green company succeed. Moreover, since our scheme correlates
the payoff to the established company to the success rate of the
green company, it incentivizes established businesses that receive a green option to use their market position to promote the
green technology in which they are invested.
Established businesses can help green companies in several important ways. On the most basic level, they can provide
economic advice and guidance. Drawing on their own experience, connections, and business acumen, large corporations can
help startups avoid critical mistakes. They can also instruct as
to how to allocate existing resources more efficiently and how to
raise new funds. Receiving free advice will generate another
benefit for green companies: it will enable them to save funds
that they might have otherwise spent on buying consulting services.
Sharing information and knowledge is not the only means
by which established businesses can help green companies.
They can adopt the green technology at issue and use it in their
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own operations. Doing so will obviously create revenues for the
green company. Equally important, it will give the green company an invaluable opportunity to test the technology and to
show that it works in the real world. Moreover, such a move
will send a signal to the market about the quality of the green
147
technology. The signaling aspect is especially important in
this case since the established company is presumed to have
superior information relative to the rest of the market owing to
its special relationship with the green company and because
the signal in this case is very costly for the established busi148
ness.
Finally, large corporations can help green startups gain
foothold in the market by introducing them to their clients, financiers, and other business partners. Establishing a new
business relationship will be particularly easy if the established
corporation chose to adopt the green technology in its operations. But even if the established corporation decided not to use
the green technology, it should be able to open new doors for
the green company for two principal reasons. First, under the
terms of our proposal, the established company could turn
down the offer of the green company and invest in an alternative green technology. The fact that it chose not to do so means
that it sees real potential in the green company whose option it
has taken. Second, after the option has been taken, the fates of
the two corporations become intertwined. Failure by the green
company may have adverse consequences for the established
firm, as well as for its suppliers, clients, and business partners.
As a result, all the businesses that work with the established
firm have an indirect interest in the success of the green company.
The benefit flow is not a one-way street, as even established firms can immensely gain from collaboration with green
companies and technologies.
2. The Political Perspective
Established businesses can also affect the legal and regulatory regimes that govern the different businesses. Public choice
147. See Amna Kirmani & Akshay R. Rao, No Pain, No Gain: A Critical
Review of the Literature on Signaling Unobservable Product Quality, 64 J.
MARKETING 66, 66 (2000).
148. The incorporation of a new technology into a business requires a considerable investment of resources. At times, it requires a complete overhaul of
the business model.
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theorists have long analogized the political arena to a market
environment in which goods and services are bought and sold.
The pioneering work of public choice theorists, such as Gordon
149
150
151
152
Tullock, James Buchanan, Sam Peltzman, Gary Becker,
153
and Anne Krueger, famously suggested that government ser154
vices are sold by politicians to private bidders. Subsequent
empirical studies validated the main predictions of the theo155
ry. Large industry participants can use their wealth to secure
favorable legislation and regulation, or, conversely, to pass leg156
islation that adversely impacts their competitors. Successful
firms, in other words, must establish a presence in the political
157
arena.
Small startup firms do not share a similar ability to affect
the political process for two main reasons. First, they don’t
have the financial wherewithal to secure legislative and regula158
tory changes. Put in stark terms, small companies simply
149. See Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and
Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224, 228 (1967).
150. See, e.g., James M. Buchanan, Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking, in
TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY 3, 8–11 (James M. Buchanan et al. eds., 1980).
151. See, e.g., Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation,
19 J.L. & ECON. 211, 211–13 (1976).
152. E.g., Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups
for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371, 392 (1983).
153. See, e.g., Anne O. Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking
Society, 64 AM. ECON. REV. 291, 302 (1974).
154. For discussion of the implications of public choice for environmental
law and economics, see MICHAEL FAURE & GÖRAN SKOGH, THE ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND LAW 171–77, 203–05 (2003).
155. See, e.g., Thomas Stratmann, What Do Campaign Contributions Buy?
Deciphering Causal Effects of Money and Votes, 57 S. ECON. J. 606, 615 (1991)
(discussing how members and lobbyists of the sugar industry were able to extract legislative favors in exchange for donations).
156. See Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals’ Costs, 73
AM. ECON. REV. 267, 267–68 (1983) (stating that government regulations are
prone to rent-seeking behavior as it would be in the best interests of the firms
with lobbying power to raise competitors’ relative compliance costs).
157. See Jill E. Fisch, How Do Corporations Play Politics?: The FedEx Story, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1495, 1558 (2005) (observing that “firm competition takes
place both in the marketplace and in the political arena; the dynamics of one
environment affect the other”).
158. Just to get a sense of the amounts involved, the entertainment industry spent $123 million on lobbying efforts in 2011. Ctr. for Responsive Politics,
TV/Movies/Music: Industry Profile 2011, OPENSECRETS, http://www
.opensecrets.org/lobby/indusclient.php?id=B02&year=2011 (last visited Dec.
12, 2014). The Internet industry topped that amount with $127 million in
spending. Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Computers/Internet: Industry Profile
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cannot afford the “price” politicians require for their services.
Accordingly, many environmental startup firms have no voice
in the political process. They must live and die by the laws and
regulations designed by their larger, more established peers
without any meaningful ability to stop them from being enacted
or affecting their content.
Second, as Jill Fisch demonstrated, a one-time political do159
nation cannot get a firm a say in the political process. Rather,
firms gain political clout through multiple interactions with
160
politicians that occur over an extended period of time. Corporations must establish bonding and trust with political actors
before they can turn to them for help. This requirement puts
new corporations at a serious disadvantage relative to more established ones. Even if a new corporation decides to make a
campaign contribution in an attempt to amend the prevailing
regulatory regime it is unlikely to find a political actor who will
be willing to play along.
The political fortunes of a small corporation can dramatically change if it can find a larger corporation to take it under
its wing. In this case, the more established business could use
its political and financial capital to watch out for the interests
of the small firm and ensure that it gets adequate representation in the political arena. By effecting a partial financial
alignment between the interests of green corporations and established businesses, the implementation of our proposal will
provide the latter a meaningful incentive to support environmentally friendly regulation or, at the very least, not to oppose
161
it.
One may wonder whether our proposal gives the established business a sufficient monetary incentive to mobilize its
political allies in favor of the relevant environmental cause. We
can think of three responses to this concern. First, as we explained, in many cases all that is required from the established
corporation is not to block (or effectively veto) pro2011,
OPENSECRETS,
http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/indusclient.php?
id=B12&year=2011 (last visited Dec. 12, 2014). Google Inc. alone spent $9.7
million toward this end. Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Annual Lobbying by
Google Inc., OPENSECRETS, http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/clientsum
.php?id=D000022008&year=2011 (last visited Dec. 12, 2014).
159. See Fisch, supra note 157, at 1559 (describing how established corporations foster relationships with politicians over extended periods of time in
order to secure favorable (de)regulatory treatment).
160. Id. at 1559–60.
161. The same is suggested in ENDRES, supra note 6, at 200–02.
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environmental regulation, and even a modest financial interest
should suffice to achieve this result. Second, under the current
political environment, there exists significant political goodwill
to promote environmental causes. Consequently, the cost of
mobilizing pro-environmental initiatives may be much lower
than the cost of opposing them. Third, and most importantly,
often the relevant level for intervention is the local level of government. Many of the regulatory standards that apply to construction, transportation, and energy are set at the local lev162
el, and affecting political decision making on the local level is
far less costly than attempting to influence lawmakers on the
state or nationwide level.
3. The Social Perspective
As we explained, society has a clear interest in protecting
the environment by avoiding unnecessary environmental harm.
This social goal implies, at the very least, that legal policies
that impede green innovation should be repealed in order to
give green innovation a chance to compete on a level playing
field. For the reasons we discussed, however, removing the legal obstacles will fall short of achieving this objective on account of the business barriers to green products and technolo163
gies.
One could suggest at this point that the best way to level
the playing field is to subsidize green technologies. After all,
green technologies confer a benefit to the public and hence it
makes sense for the public to fund them. We would caution
against this superficially alluring solution. In fact, we contend
that our proposal is clearly superior to subsidization. There are
several problems with the subsidization solution. First, any
subsidization scheme gives rise to a herculean information
challenge. Even if all politicians were benign and well-meaning,
which is clearly not the case in the real world, they would still
need to overcome two dual informational problems prior to
adopting a subsidization plan: they would need to decide which
green technology to subsidize and by what amount. Failure to
make both decisions correctly will distort competition among
green technology companies by channeling excessive amounts
162. Kirsten Engel, State and Local Climate Change Initiatives: What Is
Motivating State and Local Governments To Address a Global Problem and
What Does This Say About Federalism and Environmental Law, 38 URB. LAW.
1015, 1016–20 (2006).
163. See supra Part I.B.
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of public funds into the wrong hands. However, given the early
stage at which subsidization decisions ought to be made and in
the absence of market feedback, the government cannot possibly make the correct decisions.
Second, once we move from the ideal world of Pigouvian
government that only acts in the best interest of the public to
the real world in which at least some politicians seek to maximize their narrow self-interest over that of the public, the shortcomings of subsidization rush to the fore. There is a voluminous
literature documenting how politicians use subsidies to benefit
164
their supporters, rather than the public at large. In light of
our past experience with subsidization, it is highly unlikely
that the resources will be allocated optimally, and, worse yet, a
considerable amount of money will be squandered in the process as private corporations will engage in fierce, albeit unproductive, competition for the subsidies doled out by the govern165
ment.
Third, and finally, subsidies come from the public fisc.
They use up money that could have been used to advance other
important public goals. Alternatively, the government could
raise the funds necessary to subsidize a certain economic activity by raising taxes. However, politicians are highly disinclined
to levy new taxes on the public or even to raise existing ones.
Furthermore, it bears emphasis that taxation creates its own
166
economic costs, including a considerable deadweight loss.
Our solution, by comparison, sidesteps the main problems
that attend subsidization. Our solution relies on the market rather than on the political system. Although markets are far
from perfect, they have several critical advantages in the present context. Markets do not only allocate goods and services to
their highest value users; they produce valuable information in
167
the process. Furthermore, market competition is the best way
164. BRUCE E. CAIN ET AL., THE PERSONAL VOTE: CONSTITUENCY SERVICE
ELECTORAL INDEPENDENCE 197–98 (1987); Avinash Dixit & John
Londregan, The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistributive
Politics, 58 J. POL. 1132, 1133 (1996); Herbert Kitschelt, Linkages Between Citizens and Politicians in Democratic Polities, 33 COMP. POL. STUD. 845, 849
(2000); Rigoberto A. Lopez, Campaign Contributions and Agricultural Subsidies, 13 ECON. & POL. 257, 271–72 (2001).
165. Green, supra note 128, at 426.
166. Ian W.H. Parry & Wallace E. Oates, Policy Analysis in the Presence of
Distorting Taxes, 19 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 603, 604 (2000).
167. F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519,
526 (1945).
AND
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we have of ensuring the success of the best technologies. Over
time, competition tends to select the more efficient technologies
and channel resources in their direction. Our proposal provides
a helpful illustration of the advantages of competition. Under
our proposal, established businesses can turn down a green option as long as they have invested in rival green technology.
The opt-out mechanism that is built into our proposal enhances
competition in two related ways. First, it gives established
businesses an incentive to educate themselves about the green
technologies that are available on the market and actively
search for the best ones. Second, it gives green companies an
extra motivation to improve their processes and products. Under our proposal, green companies cannot get complacent and
rely on the green option to bail them out because if their technology is not good enough, established businesses will turn
down the option and invest instead in the superior technology
of another company.
A final advantage of our proposal is that it does not require
public spending. Consequently, it does not give rise to the familiar political economy objections that attend subsidization.
First and foremost, it does not raise the specter of corruption.
By preserving open market competition, we make sure that all
investment decisions will be made strictly on the merits. An established business that invests based on favoritism will quickly
lose its investment and be disciplined by the market. Second,
our proposal frees up public money for other important purposes. It will bestow a benefit on the public without exposing it to
169
any significant cost. Thus, from a societal perspective, there
are weighty reasons to favor our proposal over subsidization.

168. See, e.g., Lital Helman & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Best Available
Technology Standard, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1194, 1212–29 (2011); Philip J.
Weiser, The Internet, Innovation, and Intellectual Property Policy, 103 COLUM.
L. REV. 534, 583–600 (2003).
169. One could argue that by forcing public corporations to invest in green
technologies we may bring about the downfall of many established businesses,
which will lead to an economic crisis. We find this scenario is unfounded. For
this result to happen, all, or at least most, established businesses should lose
considerable amounts of money because of their investment in green technologies. It is virtually impossible to imagine a world in which this risk will materialize. Green technologies do not present such a risk. In fact, most green
technologies represent an opportunity for the recipient firms to improve their
operations and become more profitable.
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III. ADDRESSING POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS: SHOULD
OUR PROPOSAL GET THE GREEN LIGHT?
In this Part, we would like to address several potential objections to our proposal. We believe that in addition to the more
specific objections that we explored in Part II as we were laying
out our proposal, one can come up with three more general objections. First, one could argue that the concept of “green technology” that lies at the core of our proposal is too vague and as
a consequence our proposal may be subject to manipulation.
Second, one might contend that the government has no business intervening in the operations of private corporations and
should certainly stay out of their investment decisions. Third,
and finally, one may wonder why focus on the environment
when there are other worthy social goals that may be equally
important. We take on these objections in order.
A. WHAT’S GREEN?
The first objection to our proposal centers on the concept of
“green technology.” Adopting a cynical perspective, one could
argue that under a very lax definition any technology can be
170
defined as “green.” After all, green technologies are not selfidentifying and what is environmentally friendly is open to de171
bate. If this is the case, established businesses can easily manipulate our system by investing in any technology.
While the concept of green technology is central to our proposal, we do not consider the problem insurmountable. In fact,
we posit that there is a simple fix. The task of defining what
technologies are green is not nearly as daunting as one might
think. In our opinion, the task of defining what constitutes a
green technology should not be performed by the government.
Rather, it should be left to the market, or more specifically, to

170. Here we could not help but be reminded of Oscar Wilde’s famous definition of a cynic. Wilde famously defined a cynic as “[a] man who knows the
price of everything and the value of nothing.” OSCAR WILDE, Lady Windermere’s Fan, in THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING EARNEST AND OTHER PLAYS 45 (Peter Raby ed., Clarendon Press 1995) (1892). Wilde’s definition is very fitting in
our case.
171. See Elizabeth K. Coppolecchia, Note, The Greenwashing Deluge: Who
Will Rise Above the Waters of Deceptive Advertising?, 64 U. MIAMI L. REV.
1353, 1401–02 (2010) (arguing that courts and laypeople have trouble determining the validity of “environmentally friendly” claims because of a lack of
any objective criteria).
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private certification organizations. Such certification organizations need not be invented or created; they are already in existence. At present, there are several certification organizations
that award green certification marks to businesses that meet
173
certain predetermined criteria. Those certification organizations can also be relied upon for the purpose of implementing
our proposal. Only companies who receive a green certification
mark from a reputed certification organization would be entitled to use the green option.
At this point, one may wonder what would stop corporations that seek to evade our scheme from establishing a new
certification organization that would award bogus green certification marks to businesses that do not deserve to receive
174
them. Once again, we are unfazed by this possibility. There
are two simple ways to stem concern with strategic abuse. The
first way is to adopt a rule that only certification organizations
that have been in existence for ten years or more prior to the
adoption of our proposal would have the power to award green
certification marks. The imposition of this limitation would
preemptively bar attempts to rig our system by establishing
fraudulent certification bodies.
While we are mindful of the fact that there will be a certain
time lag between the adoption of our proposal into law and its
use in practice, the lag should be much shorter than ten years.
As a result, even established businesses that are ideologically
opposed to our plan will have to act in accordance with it and
invest in green technologies. After that point, they will no longer be motivated to try to manipulate the system.

172. The certification is typically given via certification marks. For discussion of certification marks, see BARTON BEEBE ET AL., TRADEMARKS, UNFAIR
COMPETITION, AND BUSINESS TORTS 40 (2011) (“Certification marks serve to
certify conformity with centralized standards. . . . [They] are meant to bear the
‘seal of approval’ of a central organization . . . .”).
173. Examples include Green Mark certification (GREEN MARK,
http://www.greenmark.co.uk/index.php (last visited Dec. 12, 2014)), Green
Business Bureau certification (GREEN BUSINESS BUREAU, http://www.gbb.org
(last visited Dec. 12, 2014)), Green Seal certification (GREEN SEAL,
http://www.greenseal.org/GreenBusiness/Certification.aspx (last visited Dec.
12, 2014)), and Green Business certification (INSTITUTE FOR GREEN BUSINESS
CERTIFICATION, http://www.gbcertified.com/11-Home.asp (last visited Dec. 12,
2014)).
174. Jorgen Wouters, ‘Tested Green’ Certification Scam Busted by FTC,
DAILYFINANCE (Jan. 12, 2011), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2011/01/12/tested
-green-certification-scam-busted-by-ftc.
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A second possible response to the possibility of manipulation is to get the government involved in an overseer capacity.
Specifically, the government can be given the power to decide
which certification organizations can be trusted with the task
of awarding green certification marks. It bears emphasis that
the government will not be required to select a single certification organization for the purpose of implementing our scheme.
On the contrary, under our vision, there will be multiple certification organizations that will compete among themselves. This
way, no single certification organization will be able to charge
monopolistic prices to green technology companies. The role of
the government should therefore be limited to that of a gatekeeper: it should ensure that fraudulent certification organizations do not take advantage of the system.
Of course, the two aforementioned mechanisms could be
combined. The government, in performing its role, can prescribe that only certification organizations with an adequate
past record and a sufficiently long history of operation will be
eligible to award the green technology certification mark. Together, these steps should suffice to assuage the risk of abuse,
especially if these measures will be backed by criminal penalties and civil sanctions on manipulators.
B. WHOSE GREEN?
Another possible objection to our proposal is that the government should not intervene in the decision making processes
of private corporations. Corporations, so the argument goes,
should not be burdened with the task of furthering social
175
goals. The goal of corporations is to maximize profits for
stockholders and not worry about the public at large. Of course,
corporations could be regulated in order to prevent harm to
third parties, but they should not be required to affirmatively
promote social goals that include the environment. In sum, the
argument can be summarized as follows: corporations should
worry about the “green” in their shareholders’ bank accounts
176
and not about the green in nature.
We find this objection somewhat anachronistic. This is not
the place to rehearse the entire normative debate on corporate
responsibility. Nor is it necessary to do so here. We live in the
175. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History
for Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439, 441–42 (2001).
176. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 133 (40th anniversary
ed. 2002).
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177

age of regulation. No economic activity is completely immune
178
from the government’s regulatory powers. Nor should it be. In
a society where most resources are in private hands and actors
have extensive discretion to use them as they please, it is necessary to impose certain constraints on market transactions in
order to ensure that they do not lead all of us astray.
Nor is it true as a factual matter that the government can
only regulate to prevent harm, but cannot use its regulatory
powers in order to secure a benefit. Moreover, the distinction
between harm prevention and benefit conferral is not very use179
ful in the environmental context. For example, when the government regulates the use of environmentally sensitive amenities in order to prevent their destruction, is it employing its
regulatory powers to prevent harm or to secure a benefit?
There is no obvious answer to this question. But there is an
even greater problem with the harm/benefit distinction. One
may wonder why we should wait until the environment is actually harmed—possibly irreparably—in order to impose regulations, instead of preempting the problem. After all, if protecting
the environment is a worthy goal, what is the point of waiting
until harm occurs? Indeed, in the eminent domain context,
courts have abandoned the distinction between harm prevention and benefit conferral and have allowed the government to
impose far-reaching restrictions on the use of environmental
resources without requiring it to pay compensation to the own180
ers.
One may nonetheless argue that our proposal “goes too far”
in that it forces established businesses to take a stake in green

177. JAMES A. LOWE & MARK L. WAKEFIELD, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS
LIABILITY § 67:37 (3d ed. 2000) (“We live in an age of regulation . . . .”); Kimberly Koscielniak, Litigation Searching, 83 MICH. B.J., May 2004, at 45 (“[I]n
this age of regulation. . . .”); David Levi-Faur & Jacint Jordana, Preface: The
Making of a New Regulatory Order, 598 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 6,
6 (2005) (quoting Scott Jacobs, the head of the program on regulatory reform
of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, as stating,
“we live in the golden age of regulation”).
178. See Douglass C. North, The Growth of Government in the United
States: An Economic Historian’s Perspective, 28 J. PUB. ECON. 383, 384–87
(1985).
179. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1026 (1992).
180. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535
U.S. 302, 343 (2002); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 632 (2001); Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149,
151–61 (1971).
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181

companies. We disagree. We do not view our proposal as particularly extreme or invasive. The law constrains corporate behavior in a myriad of ways. The law controls information dis182
183
closure by corporations, prescribes compensation methods,
184
and mandates certain governance structures. In certain cases, the law goes further and limits the investment choices of
certain financial establishments, forcing them to avoid invest185
ment opportunities that involve excessive risk. It is noteworthy that in response to the 2008 economic crisis a growing
number of theorists proposed that such limitations be used
186
more extensively. True, our proposal differs from existing restrictions in that it imposes an affirmative investment obligation on established businesses. However, it would not be the
first time that the law imposes an affirmative duty on corporations. Many of the legal rules that pertain to information disclosure, compensation methods, and corporate governance im187
pose affirmative duties on corporations.
Moreover, we do not think that much should turn on the
distinction between affirmative regulation that requires performance of certain acts and negative regulation that requires
181. Jim Nelson, US Government Should Trust the Free Market for Green
Energy Investment, RENEWABLEENERGYWORLD (May 29, 2012), http://www
.renewableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2012/05/us-government-should
-trust-the-free-market-for-green-energy-investment.
182. Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55 DUKE L.J. 711, 737–40 (2006).
183. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 5567 (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 7243 (2012); Stephanie
L. Soondar & Allen Major, Litigation and Recoupment of Executive Compensation, 6 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 397, 398 (2010).
184. 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1; Sanjai Bhagat et al., The Promise and Peril of Corporate Governance Indices, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1803, 1806 (2008).
185. Franklin A. Gevurtz, The Role of Corporate Law in Preventing a Financial Crisis: Reflections on In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation, 23 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 113, 120 (2010).
186. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE CRISIS OF CAPITALIST DEMOCRACY 335–62
(2010); John C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the
Treasury Have a Better Idea?, 95 VA. L. REV. 707, 774–81 (2009); Richard
Squire, Shareholder Opportunism in a World of Risky Debt, 123 HARV. L. REV.
1151, 1203–05 (2010); Squam Lake Working Grp. on Fin. Regulation, An Expedited Resolution Mechanism for Distressed Financial Firms: Regulatory Hybrid Securities 3–5 (Council on Foreign Relations, Working Paper, 2009).
187. Jeffrey D. Bauman, Rule 10b-5 and the Corporation’s Affirmative Duty
To Disclose, 67 GEO. L.J. 935 (1979); Dennis J. Block et al., Affirmative Duty
To Disclose Material Information Concerning Issuer’s Financial Condition and
Business Plans, 40 BUS. LAW. 1243, 1244–57 (1985); Sean M. Donahue, Executive Compensation: The New Executive Compensation Disclosure Rules Do Not
Result in Complete Disclosure, 13 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 59, 65 (2008).
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abstaining from certain activities. Rather, it is the nature and
the extent of the interference that should matter. Our proposal
represents a relatively modest encroachment on the autonomy
of established corporations. Obviously, it requires large corporations to take a stake in smaller green companies. But it
leaves large corporations extensive freedom in deciding which
green companies to choose. Furthermore, it does not entail a
considerable interference in the business activities of the receiving firm. Nor does it expose the receiving firm to a high level of risk.
Finally, we would like to note that there are many examples of legal mechanisms that incorporate call (and even put)
options. The most famous example is the government power of
188
eminent domain. The government essentially holds a call op189
tion on all private property. It can exercise this option as long
as it meets the “public use” requirements and it pays the owner
190
“just compensation.” Interestingly, the government exercised
191
its takings power to further distributional goals and spark
192
economic growth, and the Supreme Court approved these exercises of the takings power even when the title to the taken
properties was transferred by the government into private
hands. More importantly, perhaps, there exist multiple examples of legal rules that grant call and put options to private actors. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, many states
adopted “mill acts” that empowered private actors to condemn
193
land suitable for the operation of mills. Also, in the nine188. 6A WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER,
OF CORPORATIONS § 2901 (2013).

FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW

189. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Taking Compensation Private,
59 STAN. L. REV. 871, 892 (2007).
190. U.S. CONST. amend. V; Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469,
482–83 (2005); Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 243 (1984); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 29 (1954); D. Benjamin Barros, The Police Power
and the Takings Clause, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 471, 498–524 (2004); Abraham
Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Uselessness of Public Use, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 1412, 1426–48 (2006); William A. Fischel, The Political Economy of Public Use in Poletown: How Federal Grants Encourage Excessive Use of Eminent
Domain, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 929, 932–35 (2004).
191. See Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 243.
192. See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 484; Whittaker v. Cnty. of Lawrence, 437 F.
App’x 105, 108 (3d Cir. 2011); Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 60 (2d Cir.
2008).
193. See generally Head v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 9, 16–21 (1885).
For a historic review, see Charles E. Cohen, Eminent Domain After Kelo v.
City of New London: An Argument for Banning Economic Development Takings, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 491, 500–08 (2006).
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teenth century, railroad companies were empowered to take
private property in order to facilitate the construction of
194
tracks. But the use of options is not merely a thing of the
past. At present, the laws of many states resolve encroachment
disputes by granting the encroached upon party a call option on
the projecting structure, or a put option that enables her to
195
force a sale of the encroached upon land to the encroacher. In
sum, our mechanism will be breaking no new ground as far as
the use of options in the law is concerned.
C. WHY GREEN?
A final objection to our proposal centers on our focus on environmental goals. After all, there are many other worthy social
goals that policymakers should strive to advance. Why then
should the environment take precedence over other important
196
social goals? For example, why shouldn’t we force corporations to invest in health-related innovation or education institutions, rather than in green technologies?
Actually, we do not disagree. We do not presume to provide
a cardinal or even ordinal ranking of social values. Such an undertaking is clearly beyond the scope of this Article. This does
not mean, however, that our proposal should be rejected. Quite
the contrary. First, the fact that there may be difficulties in
ranking social goals must not create governmental impasse.
Those difficulties do not allow the government to sit idly and
refrain from promoting any social goals.
Second, and most important, although our discussion focuses on the environment, the mechanism we developed in this
Article may be used to further other socially important goals.
Indeed, it can easily be extended to other contexts. Specifically,
lawmakers can agree on a list of goals they wish to further—
without ranking them—and empower small enterprises that
promote those goals to harness the help of large businesses by
giving them call options. Of course, in this scenario, large corporations will only be required to engage in the advancement of
194. Harry N. Scheiber, Property Law, Expropriation, and Resource Allocation by Government: The United States, 1789–1910, 33 J. ECON. HIST. 232,
237–48 (1973).
195. WIS. STAT. § 843.10 (2012). See generally Ian Ayres, Protecting Property with Puts, 32 VAL. U. L. REV. 793, 800 (1998) (“[P]ut options are a traditional part of the common law and . . . they should remain so.”).
196. Majority Say Environment, Global Warming Not a Top Priority, ENVIRONMENTAL LEADER (Jan. 26, 2009), http://www.environmentalleader.com/
2009/01/26/majority-say-environment-global-warming-not-a-top-priority.
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one social interest. Hence, large establishments will have to
choose which social goals they prefer to promote, with their
choice being motivated by profit.
Viewed in this light, our proposal may hold the key not only to the advancement of environmental goals, but also for other important values. Clearly, one should proceed with caution.
Our mechanism will not work in all settings. For example, the
education sector is populated by many non-profit organizations.
Clearly, our mechanism is not suitable for non-profits. Furthermore, it is necessary to examine carefully the costs and
benefits of involving large businesses in the furtherance of every social goal. Also, alternative methods should be weighed in
every case. In the education context for example, taxation and
public funding may yield better results than our mechanism.
More generally, we do not argue that our mechanism will always work. Nor do we argue that it will always outperform the
alternatives. We do claim, however, that our mechanism should
be added to the list of options available to policymakers and
should be implemented in appropriate circumstances.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, we introduced an innovative market-based
mechanism intended to advance environmental goals. Our contribution can be seen as an answer to a call from environmental
economics to supplement the use of a familiar environmental
policy instrument with a targeted ecologically-oriented technology policy. Our mechanism employs option theory to give established businesses a financial stake in the success of green technologies.
Going against the conventional wisdom among corporate
law scholars, our analysis demonstrated that markets may be
harnessed to advance broader social goals. Furthermore, we
showed that market-oriented mechanisms can be superior to
government based incentive schemes. Markets have several obvious advantages over subsidization or conventional modes of
regulation. Markets produce valuable information about the
quality of products and services as well as about prices. Moreover, the market process aggregates social preferences better
than regulators can ever do. Finally, the market process sidesteps the political economy problems that plague political decision making. Despite the obvious advantages of markets, they
are rarely used to advance social goals. In our opinion, this is
an anomaly.
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An important lesson from our analysis is that the profit
motive of corporations can be put at the service of broader social goals. The challenge for policymakers is to adopt the right
incentive scheme that best aligns the narrow self-interest of
firms with the broader societal interest. In this Article, we explained how it can be done. All it takes is a change in the way
we think about our institutions and the goals they are supposed
to achieve.

